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ABSTRACT
The conversion of coal into other types of fuel
through gasification and liquefaction has been proposed
as a means of coping with America's increasing energy
needs.

Coal conversion plants require large quantities

of water for cooling purposes and for use as a raw material.
There are three types of water allocation presently
used in the United States, riparianism, prior appropriation,
and administrative permit systems.

The common law riparian

system is undesirable because under it water rights are insecure and subject to locational use restrictions.

Prior

appropriation is better, but the permanent water right
created under this system results in excessive rigidity.
A system of administrative regulation by means of a consumptive use permit system offers the best allocation framework for both coal conversion facilities and other water
users as well.
Kentucky presently has such a system of administrative
allocation.

However, this legislation could be improved by

(1) clarifying the planning functions of the Department
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection and the
Water Resources Authority;

(2) expanding the scope of the

consumptive use permit system by removing most of the exempted use categories;

(3) adopting beneficial use as the

basis upon which consumptive use permits will be granted;
(4) imposing a durational limit on water use permits and
delineating renewal procedures;

iii

(5) adopting a scheme for

::i'

I
I

both voluntary and involuntary transfers of water rights;

'I

;1

and (6) specifying more explicit provision for dealing

>1
I

i
i

with temporary water shortages.
Finally, it should be noted that the federal govern-

I
!

ment has an important role with respect to navigation, water
resources development, and water pollution control.

r
I
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I

i

I

Fed-

eral powers in these areas may impose some constraints on
state allocation policies, although major conflicts can
be avoided if proper coordination among state and federal
officials is maintained.

Descriptors:

* Legislation, Water Law,
* Water Policy,
Legal Aspects,
Water Resources Development
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r.

coal Conversion and Water Resources.

A.

Energy Needs and Proposed Solutions
Until recently, the United States was able to supply

through domestic sources almost 90 percent of its total
energy demands, thus insuring virtual self-sufficiency. 1
since 1971, however, energy demands have continually exceeded domestic production and the United States has relied
on foreign suppliers to make up the difference. 2

In 1973

an oil embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
countries (OPEC) demonstrated the extent of America's dependence upon foreign energy sources.
Both the availability and cost of energy greatly
affect a society's standard of living. 3

The Arab embargo

of October 1973 lasted only a short time, but the Federal
Energy Administration reported that while "massive unemployment, blackouts and other major disruptions were avoided, the embargo still had an appreciable impact."
It is estimated that the GNP dropped by $10 to $20 billion
during the embargo, and about 500,000 workers consequently
lost their jobs.

Moreover, about a third of the 9.8 percent

increase in consumer prices that year was due to higher
world oil prices. 4
Realizing the potential economic and social costs of
increased dependence on foreign sources of energy, the
President established a goal of energy independence for the
'
United
States by 1985. 5

''Project Independence 1985'' is a

long-range response to the Arab action and consists of ''a

2

series of plans and goals set to insure that by the end of
this decade Americans will not have to rely on any source of
energy beyond our own."

6

A policy of energy independence for

America will doubtlessly require the development of new energy
sources; but while this may .ultimately provide a long-term
solution to the energy problem, more efficient use of existing
resources such as coal, petroleum, natural gas or nuclear
energy is also necessary, particularly in the short run.
Unfortunately, immediate large-scale increases in the
use of oil, natural gas, or nuclear energy involve problems
of their own.

Domestic petroleum and natural gas production

cannot meet current or future demand.

Even though there are

large supplies of petroleum in this country, they are not
sufficient to keep pace with the potential demand, and to raise
production to higher levels by 1985 would involve prodigious
exploration and development costs.

7

These development efforts

would not be economically possible unless crude oil prices
remain high.
Increased reliance on natural gas would create even
greater difficulties.

The shortage of natural gas in the

United States has become more acute in the last two or three
years and now exceeds ten percent of total demands.

This is not

a result of a shifting of demands to natural gas due to the Arab
oil embargo.

Rather, it is a continuous and systematic long-

term shortage, which probably will not be eased appreciably
as long as the Federal Power Commission retains its present
regulatory policy. 8

,

Proven reserves of natural gas have steadilYI

i

3

declined in the last several years, and production at present
prices will not be able to cover anticipated demand.

9

At the present time ''nuclear and coal-fired electricity
remain the only margins against rising energy demand that
are under domestic control."lO

The development of new

nuclear energy sources entails high capital costs and long
construction lead times, and in any event, nuclear generated
electricity cannot always be substituted for gas or oii.

11

Although the rapid, short-term expansion of coal production,
may be difficult or costly, coal offers the best possibility
under proven, present technology of some measure of energy
self-sufficiency.

12

In the first place, coal in place is relatively abundant.
According to the Bureau of Mines, America's coal reserves
amount to 1,600 billion tons.

If coal use increases steadily

to 50 percent by 2000, total consumption in the entire period
from 1974 to 2000 would amount to about 70 billion tons, or
four and one-half percent of known reserves.

Exhaustion of

reserves would be roughly 100 years away in 2000, even if the
use continued to increase at a steady rate.

13

Moreover, these

abundant coal reserves can be used to create synthetic fuels,
14
primarily through gasification and liquefaction processes.
B.

Coal Conversion Technology
Most coal conversion processes produce either gaseous

or liquid fuels.

The former process is known as gasification

while the latter is called liquefaction.

4

1.

Gasification
The most promising of the modern processes for converting

coal into another form of energy is coal gasification - the act
of converting coal into synthetic natural gas (SNG).

In the

past, true natural gas coming straight out of the ground has
been used in preference to SNG. since it was both plentiful
and inexpensive.

In the years following World War II the

amount of natural gas used annually drastically increased,
and it has continued to grow even to the present day. However,
with increased usage has come a decrease in reserves, even a
shortage in some areas, and with that, higher prices.

All of

this places increased importance on the idea of converting coal
into SNG.

If the coal produced SNG can replace regular natural

gas in most applications, then technology will provide all the
advantages of gas produced energy coupled with the material
abundance of U.S. coal reserves.
The basic process of coal gasification is to alter the
chemical state of the basic mineral in such a manner that
gaseous by-products are produced.

Coal in its natural state

is organic matter composed mainly of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen,
sulfur and nitrogen, as well as small amounts of various
other minerals.

15

In coal the natural hydrogen content is

about 5% as opposed to a 75% carbon content.

16

High-quality

pipeline gas, however, contains about 25% hydrogen.

17

Thus,

"in order to convert coal to gas or liquid fuels, either
carbon must be removed or hydrogen added to the coal molecule;
precursors of pollutants, such as sulfur, must be converted
to removable compounds, and undesirable inorganic matter

I

5

The hydrogen-adding methods are usually used,
ince the carbon removing processes (such as by pyolysis) are
also because hydrogen is required to
nitrogen, and sulfur found in coal into
eompounds that allow such substances to be removed from the
produced.

19

The beginnings of the modern processes of coal gasification
the old-style gasification techniques of the early
The first coal gas company began operating in London,
in 1812 and in less than four years a similar company
producing coal gas in the United States.

20

At this time

procedure used to convert coal into gas energy was known
as "destructive distillation", and consisted of heating the
coal (in the absence of air) to a temperature where it decomposed chemically.

The gas produced form such distillation

had a heating value of from 475 to 560 BTU. per cubic foot,

21

compared with true natural gas, on the other hand, has a
value of from 980 to 1035 BTU.

22

Moreover, the dis-

process leaves 70% or more of the coal as a solid
creating additional problems.

23

Early gasification procedure took the distillation process
step further and avoided the disadvantages of the former
As in the case of destructive distillation, the
was heated and some gas was extracted in this manner.

Then,

a second step, the carbon residue of the heated coal was
to either air, oxygen or steam (or various combinations
the three) depending upon the type of by-product desired.

6

The gasses removed in this step were of generally lower
heating value than the methane produced by distillation (from
110 to 300 BTU
per cubic foot.

per cubic foot as compared to 475 to 550 BTU
Because of this, and because distilled methane

has only about one-half of the heating value of modern pipeline gas

(with a heating value of over 1000 BTU. per cubic

foot), some addition refinements were needed before coal
gasification could become a viable alternative to natural gas
at that time.
At this point, modern gasification procedure adds yet
another step,

At the present time it seems that this third

step is likely to take one of two forms.

The first of these

forms is the process known as methanation, which involves
passing the

secondary

gas over a special nickel catalyst to

convert it into almost pure methane.

So far, however, the

methanation step has not been used on a commercial scale.

24

The second method of increasing the gasses formed during the
second state of the gasification process into SNG with the high
heating values of natural gas is known as hydrogasification.

In

this process, more economically promising than methanation, coal
or char is reacted directly with hydrogen to form methane by
feeding a mixture of hydrogen and steam into the hydrogasifier,

25

{

as previously stated, hydrogasification may utilize the excess
26
carbon left over from a first stage distillation (the char) .
At the present time, seven major processes are used in the
United States to convert coal to pipeline quality gas, while
27
five processes are used to convert coal to liquid fuels.

j
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.i;rhere are also several more conversion processes on the drawing
these are completely untested at the present time.
to be gained by examining each of the seven major
processes individually, for all have many factors in common.
,,'l'he typical coal conversion process begins by crushing the coal
to a fine size, and usually oxydizing it to destroy any natural
properties.

Coking coal tends to cake when exposed to

heat, and if this should happen, gasification would be
to take place.

The coal is then devolatilized (heated

the absense of air so that it decomposed chemically - also
as destructive distillation or pyrolysis) to produce some
immediately.

The char (solid residue) left from this

then gasified by combining it with steam and oxygen to
a secondary, or synthesis, gas.

This gas then leaves

the gasifiers and is treated by means of water scrubbers and
oentifugal separators to remove tar, dust, ash and carbon impurities.28

The gas is then passed over a catysyst, which in-

creases the hydrogen to carbon monoxide ratio and speeds up
shift conversion reaction.

The gas is then purified

all but the carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen (H )
2
compounds, which are then methanated to produce pipeline
quality gas (the process of gydrogasification still being in
development).
Unfortunately, none of the methanation procedures has yet
commercially feasible.

29

At the present time there are

two commercially available gasification procedures, the
process and the Koppers-Totzek process.

30

They both work

the principle described above and both result in "producer

8

gas"

(gas too inefficient to be transmitted very far by

pipeline but which is often used by industry near the coal
conversion site) as a final product.

There an additional

methanation process would be necessary before this gas would
serve as a substitute for natural gas.

The first application

of this latter step has been proposed for an existing Lurgi
facility in the San Juan Basin of New Mexico.

In addition to

the existing commercial processes, several others are in the
developmental states, among these being Bi-gas (Bituminous
Coal Research, Inc.)

co 2

Acceptor Process (Consolidation

Coal Co.) and the Hygas Process (Institute of Gas Technology).
At the present time, Hygas is considered to be the most promisi~
of all the process being currently developed, even though
the Lurgi process has seen extensive use.
Coal gasification is not without its problems,

Even if

technical difficulties in the conversion process itself can be
overcome, synthetic gas cannot economically compete at the
present time with natural g·as.

Moreover, some systems involve

high maintenance costs while a lack of sufficient sources of
electrical power, oxygen and hydrogen may hamper the development
of others. 31

Environmental factors are also a source of concern,

particularly in the area of water use.
All of the proposed processes are going to require huge
amounts of water.

As the Institute for Mining and Minerals

Research of the University of Kentucky reported,

" [a] 11

gasification schemes require large volumes of water for hydrogen
production.

Large amounts of water are also needed for process

9

Therefore, a natural water supply in large amounts
.
32
available at a 11 times.

Indeed, the two most important

in determining the location of the conversion plant are
amounts of local coal reserves and the availability of a
supply of water,

33

The methanation reaction produces

amounts of heat (94,200 BTU./lb mole) which must be
disipated in order to prevent catalyst deactivation and
f<t·m1 -aw·av"

conditions.

34

The most effective way to dissipate

heat may be to use a "fluid-bed" type reactor for the
methanation process, which would entail an additional intake
water.

35

The Lurgi methanation process being built in New Mexico
serve as an example.

Projected water requirements for

this facility include a primary water intake of 7,000 gallons
per minute (gpm) to be gathered from outside sources.

36

This

water requirement figure is exclusive of the approximately
765 gpm that will be taken in the form of moisture in the coal
and the 630 gpm that will be produced by the methanation re-

37
.
ac t ion.

In terms of annual consumption the plant will use

approximately 17 million cubic meters of water a year, but
this figure is misleading since the New Mexico facility ''is
engineered so that only 15 percent of gross cooling requirement is met by evaporative cooling.

In other areas and under

other conditions water consumption might be considerably higher.
There are four factors which determine the amount of water
used in the gasification process.

First, the amount of water

reused must be considered, second, the type of fuel used for
firing the boilers is important, third, the means of cooling
Utilized is a significant factor, and lastly, the type and

38

10

composition (especially moisture and sulfur content) of the
feed coal must be considered.

Thus, for example, where the

coal used is low grade lignite, it has been estimated that the
"gasification of one ton [i;if lignite]
3.5 tons of water.

... consumes about

A plant built to gasify 8.5 million tons

per year of lignite would require 30 million tons per year of
water or 22,000 acre-feet.'' 39

According to one report" •.. water

consumption in coal gasification plants producing pipeline gas
3
of 250 million scf per day (7 million m per day) capacity can
3
be expected to range from about 10,000 acre-ft (12 million m )
per year where water is at a premium to 45,000 acre-ft (55
million m3 ) per year where abundant but poor quality water is
used for cooling.

The principle difference are in evaporative

cooling requirement and relate to the extent to which air
cooling is employed and greater waste-water disposal where
input water is of low quality.••

40

Thus, it must be concluded

that coal gasification requires large volumes of water under
any set of conditions.
2.

Coal Liquefaction
The second major process for converting coal into other

more useable forms of energy is the process of liquefaction,
which is the conversion of coal into liquid fuel oil.

Although

f

;;,;

i

the work on coal-to-oil conversion lags behind the coal
41
gasification effort at this time,
coal liquefaction could be

I

an extremely important tool in the satisfaction of America's

I

future energy needs.

Although the technique of coal liquefactionli0

i

is not as highly developed as is that of coal gasification - makil

I,

_________________________•

....

I

,i

I

I

I
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accurate projections risky - it has been estimated that a
typical liquefaction plant, consuming about 30,000 tons of
.coal a day, would be able to produce about 100, 000 barrels
42
synthetic crude per day.
Should such a system prove
the economic and environmental advantages would be
In the first place, the low cost, domestically
could be applied to existing oil-run power plants
\(which must now rely on a percentage of foreign produced
>supplies) without the expense of converting the plant to
coal burning one.

In addition, "an electric utility is

to find it much easier to use a low-sulfur fuel
from coal rather than operating a complicated chemical
processing step included in any gas stack cleaning system.
This is particularly true of the eastern United States where
power demands are high and substantially all of the coal is
of the high-sulfur variety.• 43
As was the case with gasification, the technology necessary
the conversion of coal to oil is not a recent discovery.
Such knowledge was available in Europe over 30 years ago, but
time the process was commercially unfeasible.

44

The

of coal liquefaction is in itself relatively simple,
·Andis actually just one step further removed from coal gas. ification.

Stated simply, " [t] he ratio of carbon to hydrogen

much higher in coal then in oil; coal liquification involves
hydrogen from coal by a gasification process and
it with coal so as to increase the hydrogen content
the coal and produce an oii.• 45

12

At the present time there are two basic plant types which
are producing a liquid fuel from coal.

These are the COED

(Char-Oil-Energy-Development) plant operating in New Jersey
since 1962 and the CSF (Consol Synthetic Fuel)plant in West
.
. .
46
V 1.rg 1.n1.a.

Several other processes exist at the present time

but it appears that COED and CSF are the most promising for
long-term use .
into oil.

In the COED process the coal is broken down

. "by exposing it to progressively hotter

temperatures in several different chambers.

The coal is placed

in a fluidized bed where the particles of coal are so small
that they behave like a fluid when placed in a rapid, upward-moving stream of air.

The process produces a

tacklike "oil"

(which must be treated with hydroge:1 to remove
47
the sulfur and make it more liquid.••
The CSF project,
however, works on a very different principle.

In this process

pulverized coal is first dissolved, and an extract from this
48
chemical reaction is recovered by the use of filters.
This
solvent is then distilled and further processed (catalytically
hydrogenated)

in order to produce an even heavier solvent for
49
the production of the synthetic oi1.
Although the liquefaction of coal ''requires considerably
less process water then that required for gasification due to
the much lower hydrogen-carbon ratios involved, it is nonetheless clear that large amounts of water will be necessary
50
if this project is to be carried on in large scale,
For
example, a COED plant will need large supplies of water for
boiler feed water, cooling tower make-up water, and emergency
steam.

51

13

an independent study the Bureau of Mines estimated a con¢ption of 17,000 acre-feet per year for each 100,000 bbl/day
produced.

52

It has also been reported that ".

• [t] he

Petroleum Council (1973) adopted a unit consumptive-use
3
0.2 acre-ft (247m ) per year per bpd capacity. 53 Until
better data becomes available, this figure translates into 20,000
per year for 100,000 barrels per day of oil.

54

This

of 20,000 AF/yr per 100,000 bbl/day is also the "rule;>ef-thum.b" adopted by the Office of Coal Research.

55

Thus

clearly appears that large amounts of water will be necessary
coal liquefaction, although perhaps not as much as would
involved in the coal gasification process.
Water Law and the Needs of the Coal Conversion Industry.
Coal gasification and liquefaction factilities will require
large quantities of water both for cooling purposes and for use
as a raw material in some of the conversion processes,

Therefore,

t.he feasibility of coal conversion as a means of meeting the
· nation's future energy needs depends, at least in part, on the
availability of an adequate and dependable water supply in areas
such facilities will be located.
as technological considerations.

This involves legal as
Not only must the necessary

be physically available, but coal conversion facilities must
to obtain a secure enough legal interest in the water to
the huge capital outlays that such an enterprise requires.
This study will examine three systems of water allocation,
order to determine which of them is most responsive to the
the coal conversion industry.

The first is the

traditional riparian doctrine that prevails in the eastern United

14

States.

The second is prior appropriation, which is found in

most of the western states.

The third approach, administrative

allocation, is a hybrid which contains features of both
riparianism and prior appropriation.

Since this study is

primarily concerned with the feasibility of coal conversion
operations in Kentucky, particular attention will be given
to this state's law of water rights, which contains elements
of both riparianism and administrative allociation.

I

I
I
Iiii

....______________________•I
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II. The Riparian System
A.

surface Water Consumptive Use Rules.
consumptive rights to contained surface waters are

governed by two major allocation systems, riparianism and
prior appropriation.

The riparian system is found in all of
1

the eastern states except Mississippi,

while the prior

appropriation system prevails in the West.

However, rip-

arian rights also co-exist with appropriative rights in
2

those western states which follow the ''California Doctrine,"
but are not usually recognized in those prior appropriation
3

states which follow the "Colorado Doctrine."
The riparian system appears to have origninated in
4

America during the early part of the nineteenth century,
although some commentators have claimed that it developed
5
6
from the French Civil Law
or the English common law.
Under the concept of riparianism, both consumptive and
7
8
which
nonconsumptive
rights arise from ownership of land
10
9
or streams.
borders on such natural watercourses as lakes
Consequently, as a general rule riparian rights do not
11

attach to artificial waterbodies,
12
waters.

or to difused surface

Although commentators have differed about the nature of
,
.
13
riparian rights,
they generally agree that no rights of
ownership attach to the corpus of the water as long as it
14
. so long as it conremains in the stream
"because.
tinues to run there cannot be that possession of it which is
15
essential to ownership.''
Instead, in most jurisdictions,

20

a riparian owner has only usufructory right to the water.

16

Moreover, riparian rights are not absolute, but correlative,17

I

and each landowner must consider the needs of other riparian

II

proprietors.

I
@

It

1.

I

The Natural Flow Doctrine

~

Ii

There are two doctrines that govern consumptive rights

I

I

I

to water under the riparian system, the natural flow doctrine &{!!
and the reasonable use rule.

¥},
~

Under the natural flow doctrine, '

I

.

have the stream flow through his land in its natural con-

I
I

dition, not preceptibly retarded, diminshed or polluted by

II

~

each riparian proprietor on a watercourse is entitled to

B

::::::·::dT:::tc::::P:r:::~::rt::tat::r::: : : : : : : ::l:::itledi
to have the stream continue flowing in its natural state
through his land.

19
$,

f

Consumptive uses are not entirely prohibited by the
rule, but a distinction is made between "natural" and
''artificial'' wants or uses.

20

Natural wants are those

necessary to sustain life and include water for bathing,
·
.
.
21
dri.nking,
house h old purposes and watering
animals.

The

natural flow doctrine allows a riparian proprietor to use as
much water as he needs for his domestic or natural uses even
i. f

.
.
.
this
drains
t h e entire
stream. 22

.

Artificial uses increase man's comfort and prosperity

23
$;

and they include irrigation, manufacturing, power generation,
mining operations and large-scale stock watering.

24

I
-J),

Riparian

I10

Ill

lB

landowners may divert water for artificial uses as long as

I

I
.....................................................there is no material interference with the natural flow of

,

21
the watercourse, but a nondomestic use which noticeably
affects the natural condition of the stream is actionable by
a downstream owner even though he is not using the stream
25

and suffers no actual damages.

The plaintiff is deemed to

be injured by the change in the natural flow or condition of
the stream and may obtain nominal damages or injunctive
26

relief.

In fact, under the natural flow rule, the lower

owner is virtually forced to institute an action in order to
protect his rights against the acquisition of a prescriptive
right by an upper riparian user even though the diversion is
27

reasonable and harmless under the existing circumstances.
In the early days of the Industrial Revolution, when
many mills and factories were powered by water, the natural
flow doctrine insured that the water passed down from one
28
Under modern conditions, however,
mill dam to the next.
the natural flow doctrine has little utility.

It prohibits

many beneficial, non-harmful uses simply because they materially
diminish the natural flow of the water.

It also permits a

riparian proprietor to play "dog in the manger"--not using
the water himself, and depriving the upstream owners of its
use as well.

For these reasons only four or five states
29

still adhere to the natural flow doctrine.
2.

The Reasonable Use Rule
The natural flow doctrine and the reasonable use rule

reflect widely divergent attitudes about man's relation to a
30

watercourse.

While the natural flow doctrine emphasizes

the right to flow of the stream and seeks to maintain, as

22
nearly as possible, the status quo of nature, the reasonable
use rule seeks to promote the fullest beneficial use of
streams by adjacent riparian owners.
Under the reasonable use rule, each riparian proprietor •

I

has a privilege to use the water for any beneficial purpose,

I
j!

provided that the intended use is reasonable with respect to Il
I

other proprietors on the stream and does not unreasonably
31
Of course,
interfere with their legitimate water uses.

I

II.
%!

the mere fact of benefit to the user does not establish the
32
Moreover, neither priority of
reasonableness of the use.

41

,,

I
I

Ii
~

ff::

use nor the extent of riparian frontage or riparian land are I
I
33
fa
.
d
d
.
d
.
.
bl
generally consi ere in etermining reasona eness.

•I

Although riparian rights are regarded as equal or correlative, each riparian user is not necessarily entitled to a
34
proportionate share of the available water.
Indeed, where
the water supply cannot satisfy the needs of all riparian

II
'iii,

8

I

users, some uses, otherwise beneficial, may be deemed unreaso,f:Jr
35
The determination
under the circumstances and prohibited.

II

of the reasonableness of a use is a question of fact to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis.

Various factors may be

t

ls'

f:·

I
~;

considered, including rainfall, climate, season of the year,

I

customs and usages, size, velocity and capacity of the

I

I

'&

I

watercourse, nature and extent of improvements on the water- I

it

i

course, amount of water taken, place and method of diversion,
place of use, previous uses, the object, the extent and type
of use, its necessity and importance to society, and the
.

.

uses, rights, and reasonable needs of other riparians.

by its location on the stream.

36

The riparian proprietor at

I
IIw;

l
I
{ii

II

I

I,
I
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:its mouth may capture all he can, while the uppermost riparian
37
consider the needs of downstream users.
The reasonable use, like the natural flow doctrine,
distinguishes between natural and artificial uses, and gives
38
preferential use treatment to the former category.
Thus, a
natural or domestic use will always be treated as reasonable,
39
while competing artificial uses may be enjoined,
but no
other preferences are recognized under the reasonable use
<: rule between types or classes of use.

Finally, the reasonableness of a particular use must be
determined by present conditions and not by speculation
40
concerning future circumstances.
Hence, in the absence of
by other riparians a single riparian owner may use
all of the water in a stream.

41
However, he does not thereby

gain any continuing right to the full flow of the stream
since upstream owners may commence reasonable uses in the
42

future.

In fact, a use which is reasonable under existing

circumstances may later become unreasonable when others
43
initiate new uses on the watercourse.
The reasonable use rule, like the natural flow doctrine,
also governs water quality:

A riparian owner may discharge

"J:;pollutants into a watercourse, but such conduct will be
unreasonable and can be enjoined if i t substantially

44
injures another riparian proprietor.
3.

Consumptive Use Restrictions.
Under both natural flow and reasonable use theories,

Water rights are based on ownership of riparian land, a

24

principle which prevents nonriparian landowners from using
watercourses and which has led to other use restrictions as
well.
(a)

Place of Use Restrictions.

(i)

Definitions of Riparian Land

Since surface water may be used only on "riparian"
45
land,
the courts have developed several tests to determine
whether a particular tract is riparian or not.

Perhaps the

most restrictive is the "source of title" test, under which
riparian rights are limited to the smallest parcel held
under one title in a chain of title leading to the present
46
The size of a riparian tract cannot be increased
owner.
47
by the purchase of contiguous nonriparian land,
and if
the back portion of a riparian tract is sold it loses its
48
riparian character.
Moreover, the subsequent reuniting of
a severed tract with the abutting tract will not re-establish
49
its riparian status.
Thus, a riparian tract can be
decreased, but never increased in those jurisdictions which
50
follow the source of title rule.
The source of title test, which tends to restrict

11

available surface water supplies to a small group of riparian

I._I

owners, originated in California and has been largely confin~I
I

to the western states.

s1

~

The rule supports their policy of

I
'
'

I~
1::

II
I

limiting riparian rights as much as possible in order to
52
provide more water for appropriators,
but this restrictive!
approach seems inappropriate for eastern states where more
available.

I

II
I

J

25
The "government survey" test, now confined to Texas,
1
54
. 1
is closely relate d to th e source o f tit e rue.

53

According

to this theory, riparian land stops at the outermost edge of
the land away from the stream as described by a single
original entry of the land in the acquisition of title from
55
the government.
The more inclusive "unity of title" rule provides that
any tracts contiguous to the abutting tract are riparian, if
held in common ownership, regardless of when they were
acquired.

56

This approach permits an increase in the size

of a riparian parcel by the purchase of contiguous land even
though the added land had been nonriparian ever since its
transfer from governmental to private ownership.

Given

the trend toward larger farms and landholdings, application
of the unity of title theory will result in a continually
expanding quantity of riparian land.

This rule has support

in both eastern and western jurisdictions.

57

The unity of title rule appears superior in an eastern
jurisdiction than the source of title test.

Often a riparian

owner can use water on land added to his riparian tract land
without unreasonably curtailing the amount of water available
for other riparian owners.

However, the failure of the

unity of title rule to impose any restriction on the amount
of added land which can become riparian when acquired by one
riparian owner may adversely affect other riparian proprietors.
Accordingly, some courts have declared that the amount of
.
58
riparian land claimed must be reasonable.
Under this
reasonable limit rule, the distance of the land from the
watercourse is taken into account in deciding the reasonableness

i!,,
Ii
I'

I.
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of the particular water use.

Arguably, this affords other

riparians some protection against monopolization of the
water by one riparian owner.
(ii) The Watershed Limitation
The concept of riparian land is further restricted in
some states by the watershed limitation, which provides that
any part of a tract of land which lies outside watershed of
a body of water is not riparian to it even though the tract
60
itself borders on a natural watercourse.
This watershed
61
limitation is followed in a number of western states
and
62
a few eastern states.
The watershed limitation is based on the assumption
that land beyond the watershed is outside the boundaries
63
established by nature for riparian ownership
and that
water used on land within the watershed will eventually
64

return to the parent body of water.

If water is abstracted

from one watershed and drained into another, downstream
owners along the first watercourse would be damaged by
diminution of the stream's flow, while those along the
second watercourse might be injured by the effects of an
65
excessive stream flow.
The rule allows a riparian owner
to use water on his land to the maximum extent while at the
same time protecting downstream owners,

and protects

riparians who are not currently exercising their riparian
rights by insuring that water will be available if needed in
the future.

27

Nevertheless, many commentators favor relaxation or
66
In the East, this
abolition of the watershed rule.
restriction often unduly limits water use and encourages
67
waste of the resource.
At the present time a few eastern
68
states have expressly adopted the watershed rule,
several
69
and the majority have not yet taken a
have rejected it,

(iii)

Effect of Nonriparian Uses

A nonriparian use is one in which water is diverted
nonriparian land.

Land which lies outside of a stream's

is also deemed nonriparian in those states which
the watershed rule.

Thus, both diversions by a

,,}l.Onriparian landowners and use of water by a riparian owners
nonriparian land are considered a nonriparian uses.
Nonriparian uses, however, are not always prohibited.
""ccording to one view, such uses are wrongful per

~

and

:riparian owners may obtain appropriate judicial relief even
70
suffered no actual damage.
In states
the reasonable use rule, however, a plaintiff
prove actual damage before he can enjoin a
use.

71

A few states permit nonriparian uses
72

they cause harm to downstream riparian owners;
nriparian use is simply one factor that is considered in
termining whether the use is reasonable in accordance with
73
requirements of the reasonable use rule.
(iv)

Transfer of Water Rights

In most states riparian righs are not transferable

28

74
apart from the riparian land to which they are incident,
but a few jurisdictions have allowed severance of such
75
In such cases the right of the nonriparian
rights.
76
and the riparian owner cannot
grantee is derivative,
77
Moreover, while the
convey a greater right than he has.
right of the nonriparian grantee is effective against his
78
riparian grantor,
it is usually inferior to the rights of
79
other riparians.
(bl

Use By Municipalities

In theory, a municipality cannot divert water for
purposes of public water supply even where it owns riparian
80
Actually, courts often refuse to prevent
property.
municipal water utilities drawing from watercourses and deny
relief on the basis of failure to show damages estoppel or
latches, or the existence of prescriptive right on behalf of

81

A few states have expressly recognized
82
Of course, municipaliti
riparian rights for municipalities.

the municipality.

normally have the power to acquire water rights by eminent
domain, and once water rights are acquired, the municipality
may sell water to nonriparians and is not bound by any of
83
the restrictions of the riparian doctrine.
4.

Prescriptive Rights
Most riparian jurisdictions allow both riparian and

nonriparian owners to acquire prescriptive rights to particula
84
water uses.
A prescriptive right constitutes a servitude
85
against the ownership adversely affected,
and thus

29

uncompensated transfer of rights from the
86
Preadversely affected riparians to the adverse user.
scription, like adverse possession, rests on the theory that
aggrieved parties should seek judicial relief within a
87
reasonable time or be forever barred from a remedy.
In order to ripen into a prescriptive right, the use
be adverse, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted,
and be made under a claim of right or title.

To establish a

right by prescription the use must be maintained in a manner
right of the riparian proprietor against whom
88
it is claimed.
An act is hostile when it is inconsistent
89
owner's rights of ownership.
Thus, a licensed
or permissive use can never give rise to a prescriptive
,right because such uses are not hostile to the titleholder.

90

The use must be visible, open and notorious so that the
owner either knows, or should know, that his rights
91
have been invaded.
It must also be continuous and uninterrupted
92
the entire prescriptive period.
Since some water
\,l.ses, like irrigation, may be sporatic rather than continuous,
is probably satisfied if the claimant uses
as his necessities require.

Of course, the initation

suit puts an end to the adverse character of the use as
any other substantial interruption during the prescriptive
93
riod.
Likewise, the adverse use is interrupted if at
during the limitation period the adverse claimant
94

or acknowledges title in the true owner .

Finally,

. e. of water by one claiming a prescriptive right must be
to necessarily imply an ouster
95
the owner's exclusive right of control.

.I
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Because of the transient nature of water, prescriptive
water rights are difficult to acquire.

In those states

which follow the natural flow doctrine, there must be an
actionable invasion of the right to the stream's natural
96
flow,
while reasonable use jurisdictions require an
actionable wrong involving actual damages to the servient
97
owner.
The scope of a prescriptive right, once acquired, is
measured by the use originally made and actually enjoyed
98
during the prescriptive period.
Once a prescriptive right
has been perfected, the water use may be changed at any
99
time,
as long as the new use does not increase the burden
100
imposed on the servient estate.
Finally, prescriptive
rights, once acquired, may be lost by abandonment, although
mere nonuse is only evidence of an intent to abandon and non
101
conclusive.
B.

Ground Water Consumptive Use Rules.

1.

Ground Water Hydrology.
Ground water is found in the zone of saturation, where

the open spaces between the sand, gravel and rock are
102
saturated with water.
Above the zone of saturation, there
is a zone of aeration that may range in thickness from a few
103
inches to hundreds of feet.
The voids in the rocks in the
zone of aeration contain both water and air, and the water
104
is held by capillarity.
In particular, soils may hold
significant volumes of water against the downward pull of
105
gravity.
The zone of saturation will usually yield water
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when pumped.

Water within the zone of aeration cannot be

tapped by wells, but it does provide water to plant life on
106
surface and protects topsoil against wind erosion.
Ground water may occur under either water table or
artesian conditions.

Water table conditions exist when the

ground water surface is free to rise and fall with the water
supply. The top of the saturation zone is called the water
107
Artesian conditions occur when water is confined
impervious watertight bed called an aquiclude. The
water is under pressure and will rise above the
'>water-bearing bed if a well is sunk through the aquiclude.

108

An underground formation that will yield water is
109
aquifer.
Ground water either percolates through
the aquifer or moves in response to hydrostatic pressure and
>gravity. llO

The amount of recharge depends on the permeability

or mantle rock and on the available water from
111
precipitation or streams or other sources.
This movement
from recharge areas to areas of natural drainage is normally
112
.
This
often only a few feet per day or less.
is an important factor determining the sustained
of wells, for yield is limited to the quantity of
that moves to the well from the places where the water
ground.

Wells remote from a source of replenish-

cannot yield water perennially at rates greater than
rate at which water moves through the acquifer, even
though much greater quantities of water may be available at
113
source.
The hydrology of ground water is complex and dynamic.
amount of water that may be safely extracted from a
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ground water basin is not fixed, but varies as manmade or
natural conditions affect the supply and from the ground
water formation.

These activities include artificial recharg

e,

regulation of stream flow by surface storage, vegetative
cover charges, extension of sewerage systems, paving of
stream channels, and sealing of the ground surface by the
114
spread of urbanization.
Interference between wells, overdraft of the waterbearing bed or aquifer, and contamination are all serious
115
ground water problems.
Interference occurs when wells are
not properly spaced.

When a well is pumped the water level

surface in the area around the well is lowered as a result
of the withdrawal of the water.

The water-table surface

forms a depression in the shape of an inverted cone, and
interference occurs between wells wheri the cones of depression
116
overlap.
Overdraft occurs when the rate of withdrawal of
117
water from an aquifer exceeds the rate of recharge.
If
this continues the water table will be permantly lowered and
118
Contamination includes
the aquifer is said to be mined.
119
pollution and salt-water intrusion.
2.

Underground Streams
Subsurface waters are claosified as either underground

streams or percolating waters, and different consumptive use
120
Underground or subsurface
rules apply to each category.
streams flow in well-defined channels below the earth's
121
surface, generally have ascertainable banks and courses,
and are subject to the same consumptive use rules that
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overn surface watercourses.

122

Underground streams are

elatively uncommon and one who alleges the existence of an
nderground stream usually has the burden of proof on that
123
·ssue.
Furthermore, existence and location of the underground
stream must be reasonably ascertainable from the surface
] 24
ithout excavation.

;<

Percolating Ground Water
Percolating waters "ooze, seep or filter through the
125
beneath the surface, without a defined channel."
term is commonly used by courts to represent
variety of hydrologic conditions and serves mainly to disthem from underground streams.

Ground water is

to be percolating unless it can be shown that the
flowing in an underground stream.

This is because

\visible surface indications and scientific information
usually inadequate to allow an accurate
qetermination of the source and movement of underground
Some states have even abandoned the underground
classification, and hold all ground waters to be
126
' percolating.
This convergence of physical facts, legal
>presumptions and standards of proof no doubt explains why
ourts have in the vast majority of cases classified ground
127
ater as percolating.
Although consumptive use rules with respect to percolating
hopelessly fragmented and confused, four
can be discerned:
(2) the American rule,

(1) the absolute ownership

(3) the correlative rights

and (4) the prior appropriation system.
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(a)

The Absolute Ownership Doctrine

According to the English or absolute ownership rule, a
landowner may extract an unlimited amount of percolating
ground water from his land and use it on either overlying or
distant lands, regardless of injury to adjacent landowners.

122

The rule imposes liability only for waste or for malicious
129
injury to another.
The absolute ownership rule originated in Acton V
130
Blundell,
an English case decided in 1842. The plaintiff
in that case was a manufacturer whose well was affected by
nearby mining operations.

As the defendant pumped water out

of the shaft of his coal mine, he drew the percolating water
from under the plaintiff's well.
damages in an action on the case.

The plaintiff sought
Although the defendant's

conduct might have been actionable if a surface watercourse
had been involved, the court refused to apply the law of
surface waters because''

. no man can tell what changes

these underground sources have undergone in the process of
time .

[T]here can be no ground for implying any

mutual consent or agreement for ages past

. .

. which

is one

of the foundations on which the as to running streams is
131
supposed to be built."
Instead the court in Acton held that the defendant was
entitled to use the water as he saw fit, even if he injured
the plaintiff.

This result was justified on the basis that

the defendant as owner of the overlying land had an exclusive
132
right to any percolating ground water beneath his tract.
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The absolute ownership doctrine recognizes a vested
in the overlying landowner to percolating ground
water beneath his property whether or not he actually puts
133
It has been said that "the percolating
water belongs to the owner of the land, as much as the land
134
However, since a
ltself, or the rocks and stones in it."
landowner has no rights against an adjoining landowner who
all the water under his land and dries up his
is somewhat misleading to say that he owns "absolutely"
135
Instead it would
the percolating water under the land.
seem that the landowner does not really own the water until
136
'he has reduced it to actual possession.
The property
•right involved is the landowner's exclusive right of access
to the ground water through his land, rather than ownership
137
of the underground water itself.
Followed by many American jurisdictions in the nine138
teenth centry,
the absolute ownership rule is still
139
.recognized in a number of states.
The absolute ownership
"doctrine, however, now is often criticized because it fails
·to take into account the nature of ground water and because
favors municipalities and other large users who are able
140
drill deep wells.
(b}

The American Rule
141

The American or reasonable use rule,

allows a landowner

use as much percolating ground water as he needs, regardless
any adverse effect on other landowners, as long as the
ter use is reasonably related to natural use of his overlying
142
and.
The use must be beneficial; malicious or wasteful
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143
and may be enjoined
144
even though the plaintiff has suffered no actual damage.

use is considered unreasonable per se

As a general rule, however, the use of water on overlying
land for agricultural, domestic, mining or manufacturing
145
purposes is deemed to be reasonable.
The absolute ownership doctrine and the American rule
are virtually the same with respect to the landowner's right
to use percolating ground water on overlying land, but
differ significantly in their approach to the extraction and
transportation of ground water for use in distant areas. The
absolute ownership doctrine permits ground water to be
transported and used on non-overlying land without liability
even though neighboring landowners are injured.

According

to the American rule, however, the sale or use of water on
distant lands is unreasonable and actionable if it impairs
the ground water supply of another landowner, even though
146
the defendant's use is beneficial.
The leading case on the American rule is Forbell v.
147
The plaintiff in Forbell used ground
City of New York.
water in connection with farming operations on his land. The
City of New York, which owned an adjoining two-acre tract
sank a number of wells in order to obtain water for sale to
the City of Brooklyn.

When the defendant's wells interferred

with his farming operations, the plaintiff sought injunctive
relief.

Although the court conceded that there would be no

liability under the absolute ownership doctrine, it neverthel
enjoined the defendant's extraction of ground water for
transportation and sale to distant users.
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The American rule has displaced the older absolute

C, ownership doctrine in many jurisdictions, and is now probably
.
. .
148
l h
.
the majority position.
At ough the American rule differs

absolute ownership theory where the use of ground
on nonoverlying land is concerned, the two rules are
similar conceptually and the American rule may be
regarded as a modification of the absolute ownership doctrine.
Both rules agree that ownership of percolating waters is in
'overlying landowners,

150 b

.
ut the American rule places

reasonable limitations upon the exercise of ownership rights
on much the same basis as the law of private nuisance.
absolute ownership doctrine, the American rule
offer any meaningful protection to this property
interest, but favors large users at the expense of farmers
and domestic users who tend to have shallow wells and less
152
powerful pumps.
(c)

The Correlative Rights Doctrine

The correlative rights doctrine provides that each
owner over a common ground water pool has an equal and
correlative right to make a beneficial use of the water on
·his overlying land.

The correlative rights doctrine is

C!!lometimes known as the "California rule" because it was
i;introduced by the California Supreme Court in Katz v. Wal153
.lttnshaw.
The plaintiff in the Katz case was using ground
and irrigation purposes on land overlying
basin.

He brought suit when the defendant began

water for sale and use outside the basin.

The

use of ground water on nonoverlying land

149
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would not be allowed if it caused injury to an overlying
user, but went on to declare that landowners above a conunon
underground basin have such coequal rights in the underlying
waters as to require that it be prorated among them when the
available supply was not sufficient to meet the needs of all
In addition, the court applied the principles of prior
appropriation to transfers of water beyond overlying land.
Thus, as between outside users the first taker had priority
155
over subsequent users.
The Katz case, therefore, representec
an effort to unify the state's groundwater law with its law
of surface water streams, which recognized both riparian and
156
prior appropriation rights.
157
Only California strictly follows the Katz case.
In
other states the correlative rights doctrine does not attempt
to determine priority among outside users.

Outside of

California the doctrine merely provides that ground water
must be equitably apportioned among overlying owners in
times of shortage, with each owner entitled to no more than
158
his fair and just proportion.
This is sometimes known as
the eastern correlative rights doctrine.

In some instances,

particularly in the case of irrigators, the correlative
rights rule limits the user to his proportionate share,
according to his surface area as compared with the whole
159
area overlying the water supply.
Some writers view the correlative rights doctrine as an
attempt to analogize the law of percolating ground water to
160
the law of surface streams.
The approach of these two
doctrines, with their emphasis on conunon rights to water, is
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using either a surface water reasonable use or a
,correlative rights rationale a number of eastern states
161
"appear to have abandoned the American rule.
other commentators regard the correlative rights doctrine
162
an extension of modification of the American rule.
two doctrines seem to rest upon different
163
water ownership.
Under the correlative
tights rule, overlying owners have only usufructory rights
under the absolute ownership and American rules,
rights in the corpus of the water itself.

It

this perception of water as usufructory right that justifies
that overlying owners share the available
165
'water supply in periods of shortage.
The surface water
rule rests on a similar basis.
As far as equitable considerations are concerned, the
rights doctrine is superior to either the
doctrine or the American rule since small
are better protected and because the effects of a
shortage must be borne proportionately by all users.
the other hand, the correlative rights doctrine is
many of the same criticisms as the surface water
use rule.

The correlative rights rule is so

that it is exceedingly difficult to apply to
166
conditions.
Moreover, it offers no security to
developers by protecting the supply of the amount of
ter on which they have relied, nor does it permit landowners
acquire a more secure right to an adequate supply of
167
or contract.
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(d)

The Prior Appropriation System

Prior appropriation, the prevailing system of surface
water allocation in the West, is discussed at greater length
in Chapter III.

In most of those states underground streams

are subject to appropriation in the same manner as surface
168
waters.
Increasingly, these states have moved toward
public control and management in the distribution of their
169
percolating ground water as well.
Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming
now have separate ground water codes based on the prior
170
appropriation model,
and five other states, Kansas, North
Dakota, South Dakota and Alaska, have made their general
appropriation statutes applicable to percolating ground
171
water.
The remaining western states follow one of the
common law rules and do not apply prior appropriation
principles to ground water.

California, of course, follows

the correlative rights doctrine, Arizona and Nebraska follow
172
the American rule,
while Texas continues to adhere to the
173
absolute ownership doctrine.
Under the appropriation theory, overlying landowners
have no proprietary interest in percolating ground water
beneath their land as they do under the absolute ownership
and American rules.

Instead, ground water is owned by the

state or by the public and individual rights in it, which
are usufructory in nature, can only be acquired by beneficial
174
As with surface waters, during periods of water
use.
shortage the rights of later appropriators of an underground
basin must yield to those of earlier appropriators.
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Despite its greater suitability to stream water, the
~rior appropriation system has been successfully applied to
~round water in arid states.

It encourages early development

1nd use of water resources, provides users with a relatively
ecure water right, and encourages continued use by providing
175
But while prior appropriation
loss of rights by non-use.
some degree of certainty as to rights and order of
there are disadvantages to its inherent rigidity.
as it encourages the early land developers in an area,
also discourages subsequent development of valuable land
176
nee the available water supply has been appropriated.
Ground Water Pollution
Contamination of ground water has become a serious
oblem in some areas of the country.

Although federal and
177
tate legislation now deal with ground water pollution,
ivate law remedies are also available.

In the case of pol-

ution of an underground stream, the surface water reasonable
prevails and pollution which unreasonably interferes
178
uses of other overlying landowners is not allowed.
ere percolating ground waters are affected, however, neither
e absolute ownership rule nor the American rule provide
179
h protection to injured landowners.
Such cases seldom
olve a proprietary beneficial use of the water in question,
t rather a proprietary use of the land whereby the per180
lating waters are incidentally affected.
Perhaps for
the allocation rules are usually ignored and
181
ability is imposed on the basis of private nuisance,
182
183
ligence,
principles.
or strict liability
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c.
1.

The Law of Water Allocation in Kentucky
Water Resources in Kentucky.
Kentucky's climate and topography insure that water

generally will be available.

The average annual rainfall

ranges from 36 to 42 inches in the northern counties, 42 to
47 inches in the central portion of the state, and 47 to 50
inches in the southern area.
This produces 45-inch average
184
annual rainfall. Although there are seasonal variations,
rainfall is generally adequate throughout the year.
Kentucky has 544 square miles of streams, rivers, lakes
186
and reservoirs.
The flowing surface waters of the state
comprise a network of rivers and streams ranging from the
Ohio River and its main tributaries to the small creeks
which drain into the Ohio's lesser tributary streams.

The

Ohio' forms the northern boundary of Kentucky for a distance
of 664 miles and drains a total area of 204,000 square miles
187
(See Figure 1.)
About
from portions of fourteen states.
97 percent of Kentucky's 40,000 square mile area drains into
the Ohio River, mainly through seven major river basins:
Big Sandy, Licking, Kentucky, Salt, Green, Cumberland and
Tennessee rivers.

(See Figure 2.)

The remaining area,

located in extreme western Kentucky, drains directly into
188
There are no natural lakes of any
the Mississippi River.
size in the state, but a number of large artificial lakes or
reservoirs, such as Lake Cumberland, Kentucky Lake and Lake
Barkley, have been created by river impoundment.

In addi tioDi,'

throughout the state impoundments on small tributary or
headwater streams have created a number of small lakes and
ponds for farm use, municipal water supply or recreational
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Finally, there are many large springs, some

flowing several hundred gallons per minute in Kentucky.

190

Ground water is also plentiful in many parts of the
There are five major ground water provinces in
Kentucky, the Eastern Coal Field Region, the Blue Grass
Region, the Mississippian Plateau Region, the Western Coal
191
Region and the Jackson Purchase Region.
(See Figure
The Jackson Purchase Region and the alluvial fill areas
along the Ohio River are the richest sources of ground water
in Kentucky, but good to moderate supplies are also available
from the Mississippian Plateau and Western Kentucky Coal
192
Field regions.
Surface Water Allocation Rules.
Although Kentucky is a riparian state, it was unclear
_until recently whether it followed the natural flow doctrine
:"or the reasonable use rule since the Court of Appeals sometimes
'

i.used the two doctrines interchangably. Anderson v. Cin.
193
,:cinnati Southern Railway,
an early case, is illustrative.
J,The plaintiff in Anderson owned a grist mill on a small

"

,creek.

Two miles above the mill the defendant railroad
constructed a small dam to supply a reservoir of

•-water for its trains.

The dam, however, interferred with

plaintiff's mill and he brought suit.
The court declared that "[t]he right of every riparian
the enjoyment of a stream of running water in its
in flow, quantity, and quality is now well
194
language which implied that the court was
the natural flow theory.

Later portions of the

however, were suggestive of the reasonable use
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The owner is entitled to the reasonable
use of the water for natural and domestic
purposes; but when he undertakes to divert
the course of the stream, or detain the
water by means of a dam, so as to prevent the
previous supply to other riparian owners, he
became a wrongdoer.
The use and detention of the water on a large stream by means
of a dam, for purposes of the railroad, might
not be an unreasonable use, as ordinarily there
would be ample water left for all the purposes
of the riparian owners below; yet, where the
stream is small, or even large, if the dam
so obstructs the water as to diminish the flow
and lessen the capacity of the water power
below, it is an injury to the proprietor for
which damages may be awarded.
In the end the court reversed the trial court's decision
the plaintiff and ordered a new trial.

The court stated

plaintiff should not recover unless he suffered
injury from the defendant's use of the water.
196
In Fackler v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.R.C. Co.,
the
·defendant railroad placed a dam across a small creek,
impounding the water and preventing it from flowing into
the plaintiff's land.

The court declared that a "proprietor

entitled to have the water of a stream flow to his land
its natural course undiminished in quantity and unimpaired
197
quality."
However, relief was denied because the
not show any damage.
198
the defendant also
In City of Louisville v. Tway,
reducing the velocity of its flow.
created a pollution problem for the plaintiff.
199
stated that:

The

It is true, as suggested by counsel for
appellant, that our court is committed to the
"natural flow rule" though as we read the two
rules (reasonable use) . . . the distinction
is rather close, and even under what may be
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termed the more restricted theory (natural)
flow), . . • each riparian owner is recognized
as having a privilege to use the water to
supply his natural wants, and extraordinary or
artifical uses, so that such does not sensibly
or materially affect the quantity of the water
and such uses by the lower riparian owner.
The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show
that the defendants had made "unreasonable use of the water
from the stream."

It also declared, however, that the

defendants' dam "did not appreciably affect the flow of
water" in the stream.

Thereupon, the court upheld the lower

court's refusal to grant injunctive relief since the defendant's actions had not caused any demonstrated harm to the
plaintiff's property.
The continuing uncertainty between the natural flow
and reasonable use theories led in 1954 to a legislative
200
adoption of the reasonable use rule:
The owner of land continguous to public
water shall have the right to such reasonable
use of this water for other than domestic purposes or impair existing uses of other owners
heretofor established, or unreasonably interfere
with a beneficial use by other owners.
Although this provision was repealed in 1966, the
reasonable use rule appears to be securely established in
201
this state. Daugherty v. City of Lexington
is the most
recent case on point.

In this case the City of Lexington

denied a building permit to the plaintiff, who had plans to
build a restaurant, because he failed to show that his
septic tank system would not endanger the purity of city
water in a nearby reservoir.

The plaintiff argued that

his proposed restaurant would be a reasonable use of his
land.

The court quoted from a Michigan case, People v.

Hulbert,

202

which set forth a reasonable use formula for
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. .
in determining whether a use is reasonable
we must consider what the use is for, its
extent, duration, necessity, and its application;
the nature and size of the stream, and the several
uses to which it is put; the extent of the injury
to the one proprietor and of the benefit to the
other; and all other facts which may bear upon
the reasonableness of the use.
to the court, the determination of reasonable
use is a question of fact to which a balancing test must
The necessity of the use of water must be
considered and balanced against the harm which would ensue
the use.
Many of Kentucky cases have involved impairment of
·water quality rather than consumptive uses.
In Kraver
204
a distillery caused a pollution problem by
its waste into a nearby stream.

The court

~-

. . -...... on t h e th eory t ha t
t o a 1 ower ripar:J..iart
entitled to the natural flow of water,
unimpaired in quality, except as may be occasioned by
205
reasonable use of the stream by other proprietors'.'
Kentucky, like almost all eastern jurisdictions, limits
use of surface water to riparian land.

In Bank of

206

"~Opkinsville v. Western Kentucky Asylum for the Insane,
defendant purchased a small tract of land on a stream.
nstructed a pumping station, and transported the water
ruse on nonriparian land located about three-quarters
This diversion interferred with the opertion of the plaintiff's grist mill and he brought suit
the defendant from continuing its nonriparian use.
court agreed that the Hospital could not transport
water to a nonriparian tract if this caused injury to a

50

Kentucky apparently recognizes prescriptive rights. In
207
W.G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, a coal company obtained the
right to pollute a stream because the lower riparian owner
allowed the defendant's use to continue throughout the
statutory prescriptive period.
3.

Ground Water Allocation Rules.
Like most states Kentucky recognizes the legal distinctio,.

between underground streams and percolating ground water.
208
a plaintiff owning land on the
In Nourse~ Andrews,
Muddy River in Logan County tried to stop the City of
Russellville from using two springs for its water supply
since this caused the river to be depleted.

The plaintiff

argued that the springs were part of the source of the river
but lost when he was unable to prove this allegation.

The

court stated that one who alleges the existence of an under209
ground stream has the burden of proof and added that:
Subterranean streams, as distinguished
from subterranean percolations, are
governed by the same rules, and give
rise to the same rights and obligations
as flowing surface streams.
. The
owner of the land under which a stream
flows can, therefore, maintain an action
for the diversion of it, if such diversion
took place under the same circumstances as
would have enabled him to recover, if the
stream had been wholly above ground.
Therefore, according to the Nourse case, a landowner
may assert riparian rights to underground water only if he
can prove the existence of an underground stream.

In

2] 0

Commonwealth v. Sebastian,

such proof was established by

pointing to a line of green grass which flourished in spite
of dry weather.

The court in Sebastian also stated that
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·"there is an initial presumption that subterranean waters
are percolating, but once a subterranean stream is shown to
"eidst, there arises a presumption that it has a fixed and
211
definite course and channel."
In the case of percolating ground water, Kentucky
riginally followed the absolute ownership rule.
In Kinnard
212
the court stated that percolating
. Standard Oil Co.
'waters "belong to the soil, constitute part of it, and may
~e used, controlled, or removed by the owner in the same
manner that he could the soil through which the water
213
'percolates or runs."
In Long v. Louisville & Nashville
214
ailway Co.
the court declared that "The rule is universal
may dig on his own land such wells as he
'~eeds, al though in doing so he may dig up his neighbor's
.
215
216
The doctrine was reaffirmed in Nourse v. Andrews:
Percolating waters are part of the earth
itself, as much as the soil and stones,
with the same absolute right of use and
appropriation by the owner of the land
. . The law seems to be well settled
that water percolating through the soil
is not, and cannot be, distinguished from
the soil itself. The owner of the soil is
entitled to the waters percolating through
it, and such water is not subject to the
appropriation.
The absolute ownership rule, however, was replaced by
of reasonable use in Sycamore Coal
In this action, the plaintiff brought suit
en the defendant coal company's core hole, used to test
caused the water in his well to disappear.

The

plugged the hole, but the water rose only 14
Ches, as compared to the previous 54-inch level.

The
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court found no evidence to establish the existence of an
underground stream, and, therefore, assumed the waters to be
percolating.
The court limited the landowner over subterranean
percolating waters to a "reasonable and beneficial use of
the waters .

. and he had no right to waste them, whether

through malice or indifference, if, by such waste, he injures
218 .
Since the landowner's use was
a neighboring landowner."
"properly connected with the use, enjoyment and development
of the land its elf," the court held that he was entitled to
all he could use, regardless of the depletion of his neighbor's supply.
cases of ground water pollution have also arisen in
219
Kentucky.
For instance, Kinnard v. Standard Oil Co.
allowed a spring owner to recover damages from the defendant
because defendant's coal oil storage tanks leaked and pollu
plaintiff's spring, which was fed by percolating waters. In
220
accord is Rogers v. Bond Brothers,
where the court
221
quoted from Cooley on Torts:
It is said in an early case that where
one has filthy deposits on his premises,
he whose dirt it is must keep it that
it may not trespass.
Therefore, if
filthy matter from a privy or other
place of deposit percolates through the
soil of the adjacent premises, or breaks
through into the neighbor's cellar, or
finds its way into his well, this is a
nuisance.
222
a gas
However, in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers,
company defendant was not held liable when a newly-drilled
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"as well contaminated the plaintiff's home water source. The
that "the owner of land when putting it to a
egitimate and not unreasonable use is not liable to the
land for injuries to well or springs fed
223
hidden underground waters."
The Riparian System and Coal Conversion

Surface Water Consumptive Use Rules
The riparian system is not particularly responsive to
needs of the coal conversion industry.

This is es-

the reasonable use rule, which prevails
most eastern jurisdictions, including Kentucky.
rights should be both definite and secure:

Ideally,
the water

should be clearly defined with respect to quantity
in terms of its relation to the rights of other users.
.
. 224
reasona bl e use rue,
l
h owever, is vague and uncertain.
the nature of the reasonable use concept,
cannot know wii'ih any precision who may use the
ilable water, how much he can use, or for what purpose
This is because any use must be reasonwith respect to the uses of other riparian owners, and
e uses are constantly changing. 226

As long as these

rtainties exist, private investment in water-based enter8

such as coal conversion facilities will be discouraged.

The uncertain nature of the user's water right under
riparian system is further aggravated because mechanisms

54

for resolving controversies among water users are severely
limited.

Not only is litigation time-consuming, expensive

and uncertain in its outcome, but the results even of
successful litigation are narrow and limited in scope.
First of all, the judgment relates only to the parties before the court and not other water users.

Since the courts

will usually not apportion a stream between competing users

'

the judgment will be an "all or nothing" finding for one
party or another.

Moreover, the judgment pertains only

to the facts as they exist at a given time and new developments which change the relative positions of the parties
cannot adequately be dealt with without further litigation. 221
Another criticism is that the riparian system tends
.
1 ine
.
ff"iciencies.
.
.
228
to f oster 1 ocationa

In most states it

excessively restricts the use of the water for the benefit
.
.
l an.
d 229
o f non-riparian

Since many beneficial uses consume

water some distance from the point of diversion, these
locational restrictions probably result in less efficient
water use.

230

This could present serious problems if

some aspects of the coal conversion took place on nonriparian land.
Thus while the riparian system possesses the advantage
of flexibility, insecurity of water right and locational
restrictions do not promote efficient water use.
2.

Ground Water Consumptive Use Rules
· · · zed •
Both hydrologists and legal commentators have critic1

the existing law of water rights for its failure to recognize
the relationship between surface and ground water.

231

·
Th1 8
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terrelation between percolating ground water and
rface water supports a uniform allocation rule for all
of water. 232

Only the correlative rights doctrine

·fficiently resembles the surface water reasonable use
le, both in terms of allocative standard and in terms
underlying theory of property interest in the water,
courts to fashion a rational and integrated
.

of water a 11 oca t ion.

233

Unfortunately, the correlative rights doctrine is
deficiencies as its surface water
unterpart, the riparian reasonable use rule.

There are

uncertainties, however, under e·i ther the American
or the absolute ownership doctrine.

From the per-

the coal conversion industry, the American
e would be superior to the correlative rights doctrine
ause industrial users, who could construct the deepest
ls, would be able to secure as much water as they needed
use on overlying land without having to concern themthe requirements of smaller-scale users such as
The English or absolute ownership rule is even
suitable to the water needs of the coal conversion
Coal conversion facilities, like other industonly may obtain a secure water right (as they
rule), but the water obtained can be
owner's overlying land.

Thus, under

·absolute ownership doctrine, there are no locational
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restrictions, and additional ground water can always be
transported from distant well fields if water supplies in
the immediate area become inadequate.
It should be pointed out, however, that the absolute
ownership doctrine and the American rule, while well suited
to the needs of the coal conversion industry, are probably
not responsive to those of other water users in the state.
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III. The Prior Appropriation System.
Prior appropriation, the great rival of the riparian
system, is the primary method of water allocation west of
the Mississippi River.

There is some disagreement about the

origin of prior appropriation.

Some believe that it came

from the Indian, Spanish and Mexican occupation of the
Southwest.

Another view is that it was born of necessity in

the California gold mining camps.

1

Priority and beneficial use are fundamental elements of
the prior appropriation system.
the appropriator

The doctrine provides that

who is first in time is first in right, and

a prior or earlier appropriator is entitled to satisfy his
.
water nee d
s bef ore a sub sequent appropriator
may ta k e any. 2
Priorty of appropriation ordinarily governs the respective
rights of the various users regardless of whether the senior
appropriator diverts water at a point above or below the
points at which junior appropriators make their diversions
from the stream.

3

The junior appropriator also possesses a

legally-protected water right, although it is subordinate to
that of the senior appropriator.

Hence, "if the person who

first appropriates the waters of a stream only appropriates
a part, another person may appropriate a part on the whole
of the residue; and when appropriated by him, his right
thereto is as perfect, and entitled to the same protection,
as that of the first appropriator to the portion appro4
priated by him."
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Under prior appropriation, water rights are derived
beneficial use of the water rather than from land ownership. 5
only must the purpose of the use be a beneficial one,
the methods of diverting the water, conveying it to the
of use and applying it to the land or machinery for

it is appropriated,must also be as efficient as
6
under the circumst,rnces.
Appropriations are fixed in terms of a definite quanof water,

7

usually expressed in cubic feet per second

for direct diversion or in acre-feet for reservoir storage. 8
Often diversions are limited to specific times of the day or
Moreover, administrative procedures for appropriating
water invariably require the applicant to designate the
proposed place of use for the water he desires to appropriate. 10
place of use may be on nonriparian land. 11
In the West water rights are perpetual in duration,
although they may be lost or abandoned through nonuse. 12
For allocating water during times of shortage, or for chasing
simultaneous applications, several states have
statutes giving certain uses preferred status.

13

also give these preferred uses condemnation

Nowadays, appropriative rights usually operate within a
comprehensive statutory and administrative framework.

In

permits are issued by a state administrative
pursuant to some form of adjudicative process and the
often has the power to deny or modify permit applications
protect senior appropriators or the public

,,
'
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The proponents of prior appropriation maintain that
this approach provides for a more secure water right than
the riparian system and thus encourages more efficient use
of available water resources than its eastern rival. According to one commentator, the prior appropriation doctrine
"avoids much of the uncertainty inherent in the riparian
rights rule" by giving "each appropriator relative certainty
as to the amount of water which will be available for his
use." 16

Another commentator has characterized the prior

appropriation system as one of "secure water rights that
tend to encourage investment and thus lead to maximum use. ,,l?
Certainly the more senior appropriators are assured a
relatively dependable supply of water and thereby some
18
'
f or capi' t a l investment.
'
'
l f eatures of
security
Two a dd'itiona

prior appropriation promote efficient water use.
absence of place-of-use limitations.

One is the

Since water may be

used anywhere, approriators will be more likely to use it
wherever it can best be used.

The other feature is the

beneficial use requirement. Appropriators may obtain rights
only to water which they actually utilize and water rights
which do not continue to be exercised beneficially will be
lost under abandonment or forfeiture concepts."
The prior appropriation system is not without faults of
its own.

Although water rights under prior appropriation

are generally regarded as more certain than those under
riparianism, in many cases this is true only of senior
appropriators.
secure.

The rights of a junior appropriator are 1e 55

Since they can take only the water that remains
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after the needs of senior appropriators have been satisfied,
junior appropriators may be unable to obtain their full
·
'
'
.· appropriation
muc h o f t h e time.

19 1
'
'
A so, there is
some evidence

that the prior appropriation system is inflexible and tends
'to freeze uses of water into a rigid pattern based upon the
I.!

appropriation pattern. 20

I

This is perhaps due to

that changes in use or location,although theoreti'cally possible, are often difficult to make in practice.

21

In some states, for instance, changes in location of the
.

,

,

pace
o f use may require a new appropriation.
1

22

rigidity because no appropriator will give up
is senority in order to change his place of diversion or
Several states have attempted to alleviate this
by allowing such changes without loss of priority as
existing rights are not adversely affected.

23

Unfortunately, the effect of such a change on other appro24
is often difficult (and expensive) to predict.
same rule usually applies to changes of use as well.
difficulty in securing approval is especially acute when
applicant contemplates a change from a nonconsumptive to
consumptive use, thereby diminishing the rate of return
low to the stream and impairing the rights of downstream
appropriators.

25

Despite the beneficial use requirement, water is
metimes wasted in prior appropriation jurisdictions.
tended to be developed first because they
re easier to develop.

Unfortunately, water sent down
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a stream to those sites to satisfy senior rights may be
subject to serious transmission losses as a result of high
evaporation rates and porous stream beds.

26

Over-appropriatL~

or the practice of "padding" and "pyramiding" water rights
by obtaining permits in excess of reasonable needs is also a
serious case of waste.

27

In some instances, the excess

water claimed but not used has been allowed to run to waste
in order to avoid forfeiture of the water right through
nonuse.

28

Finally, prior appropriation does not always protect
water supply for public uses.

Western courts have often

refused to recognize public uses of water flows for recreational purposes as beneficial uses subject to appropriation and have subordinated these uses to the rights of
.

.

private appropriators,

29

although some states have overcome

this interpretation by expressly allowing appropriations for
30
.
.
various public uses.
Some commentators have urged that riparianism be
replaced by the western system of prior appropriation.

31

Although nine eastern jurisdictions have considered the idea
in the past thirty years, 32

only Mississippi has actually

abandoned its common law system in favor of prior appropriation. 33
problems.

Such a move could create severe administrative

If presently exercised riparian rights were

preserved, it would be very difficult to integrate the two
systems into a single coherent allocative framework.

The

experiences of the "California rule" states in the West
34

demonstrate the hazards of this approach.

On the other
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riparian rights were abolished, assuming that it
'was constitutional to do so, and temporal priorities were
established on the basis of historical use, the task of
uocumenting such claims would be virtually impossible. The
only alternative would be to allow all users to make new
claims and recognize temporal priorities on the basis of

35
.
.
of app 1 ication.
At first blush prior appropriation seems better suited
the needs of the coal conversion industry than the riparian
Water rights are more precisely defined and (at least
for senior appropriators) more secure under the prior approsystem than under common-law riparianism.

The ab-

place of use restrictions under prior appropriation
another advantage over the riparian doctrine.
On the other hand, as the discussion above has shown,
are a number of weaknesses in the prior appropriation
Therefore, it will be necessary to examine a third
roach, water allocation by means of a statutorily created
it is superior to both riparianism
prior appropriation.
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1.
See generally, Hutchins, Background and Modern
Developments in Water Law in the United States, 2 Nat. Res
J. 416, 416-18 (1962); Clyde, Current Developments in Wate~
Law, 53 N.W.U.L. Rev. 725, 725-28 (1959). The weight of
opinion seems to favor the latter in view of the specific
procedure which these customs left to us. Mining customs
which based property rights on discovery and development
are related to prior appropriation in which water rights
depend upon the taking possession of water and putting it
to geneficial use within a reasonable time. Busby, American
Water Rights Law: Synopsis of Its Orgin and Some of Its
Broad Trends with Special Reference to the Beneficial Use
of Water Resources, 5 S.C.L.Q. 106, 117 (1952).
2. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 926, 207
P.2d 17 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., 39 Idaho 354,
358, 227 P. 1055 (1924).
3. w. Hutchens, 2 Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States 194 (1974); Beecher v. Cassia Creek
Irr. Co., 66 Idaho 1, 154 P.2d 507 (1944).
4.
Smith v. O'Hara, 43 Cal. 371, 375 (1872).
This protection of the junior appropriative right may
be had against unlawful acts of senior appropriators as
well as by others.
5.
lA G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law
of Real Property §263 (1964).
6. Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in
Water Law in the United States, 2 Nat. Res. J. 426, 417
(1962). Although the date of priority is generally established by the date of public notice or by the date of
application for a permit, the appropriation is effectively
secured merely by applying the water to the stated use.
Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems
Companre, 9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 647, 688 (1968).
7.

5 R. Powell, The Law of Property

735 (1973).

8.
1 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States 491 (1971).
9.
§73-3-2.

N.D. Cent. Code §61-04-04 (1960); Utah Code Ann.

10.

1 W. Hutchings, supra note 8, at 517.

11.

Davis, supra note 6, at 688.

12. Johnson, The Challenge of Prescriptive Water
Rights, 30 Tex. L. Rev. 669, 673 (1952).

83

13. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-147 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
alif. water Code §§106, 1254, 1460 (1971); Kan. Stat. Ann.
B2a-707 (b) (1969); Ore. Rev. Stat. §540.140; Utah Code
n. §73-3-21 (1968); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §90.03.040
1972); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §41-3 (1959).
14.

Colo. Const. Art XVI, §6; Neb. Const. Art. XV, §6.

15.

Davis, supra note 6, at 688-89.

16. Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New
ter Rights Laws 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 797, 832 (1955).
17.

Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act. 2 Land &
Rev. 1, 36 (1967).

18. Davis, Water Rights in Iowa, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 216,
(1956).
19. Farnham, Improvement and Modernization of New
water Law Within the Framework of the Riparian System,
Water L. Rev. 377, 419-20 (1968).
20. Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35 Mo.L. Rev.l,
(1970); Maloney, Florida's New Water Resources Law,
U. Fla. L. Rev. 119, 127-28 (1957).
21. Seastone & Hartman, Alternative Institutions for
ter Transfers: The Experience in Colorado and New Mexico,
Land Econ. 31 (1963); Trelease, Policies for Water, 5 Nat.
s. J. 1, 33 (1965); Yeutter, Legal-Economic Critique of
braska Water Course Law, 44 Neb. L. Rev. 11, 41 (1965).
22. E.g. Neb. Rev. Stat. §45-172 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
Stat. Ann. §41-2 (1959).
23. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-172 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
lf. Water Code §§1700-1706 (1971); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
48-a-22; Idaho Code Ann. §42-222 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
. Stat. Ann. §82a-708(b) (1969); Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3
968); Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. §90.03.380 (1972).
24.

Farnham, supra note 19, at 421.

25.

Davis, supra note 6, at 693-94.

26. Id. at 692; Maloney, supra note 20, at 127. But
, Trelease, The Model Water Code, The Wise Administrator
the Goddam Bureaucrat, 14 Nat. Res. J. 207, 226-27 (1974).

84

27.
Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in
Water Law in the United States, 2 Nat. Res. J. 416, 419
(1962); Davis, supra note 6, at 690; Maloney, supra note
20, at 127; Hutchins, The Development and Present States
of Water Rights and Water Policy in the United States,
37 J. Farm Econ. 866, 870 (1955).
28.
National Water Commission, Water Policies for the
Future 299 (1973).
&

29.
Comment, Water Appropriation for Recreation, 1 Lana
Water L. Rev. 209, 210-14 (1966).

30.
E.g. Idaho Code Ann. §§67-4301-4304
Rev. Stat. §§538.110-538.300 (1974).

(1973); Ore.

31.
Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River
Basin Development, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 301, 302 (1957).
32. Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Wisconsin and Virginia.
See F. Maloney, R. Ausness & J. Morris, A Model Water
Code 76 (1972).
33. Miss. Code Ann. §§51-3-1 to 51-3-53
Champion, Prior Appropriation in Mississippi:
Analysis, 39 Miss. L.J. 1 (1967).

(1973);
A Statutory

3 4.
Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative
Rights to the Use of Water, 33 Tex.L. Rev. 24 (1954); Farnham,
supra note 19, at 431.
35.

Davis, supra note 6, at 691.

85

rv.

state Regulation of Consumptive Water Uses
Because water is usually plentiful in the East,

the riparian system, despite its many deficiencies, has
provided a satisfactory framework for water allocation.
since World War II, however, a number of states, ineluding Kentucky, have modified the common law doctrines
by legislative enactment.

Although some states con-

sidered adoption of the western systems of prior appropriation, most preferred hybrid systems possessing characteristics of both riparianism and prior appropriation.
Consumptive Water Use Regulation in Eastern CoalProducing States
There are twelve coal-producing states in the eastern
United States.

The common law riparian system is the

primary water allocation mechanism in Alabama, Illinois,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia.
permit systems exist in the remaining coalstates of Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
and North Carolina.
Indiana
The 1951 Ground Water Conservancy Act gives the
Department of Conservation power to restrict withdrawal
groundwater if natural replenishment is insufficient.

1

a restricted area, users of groundwater, except cities,
not increase their use by more than 100,000 gallons
day without first obtaining a permit.

2

Indiana formerly
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also had a surface water conservancy act, but this was
repealed in 1963.
2.

Iowa
In 1957 the Iowa Legislature passed a water rights

law establishing a permit system under the control of the
Natural Resources Council, administered by a Water Commissioner, and regulating rights to both surface and
ground water.

Though the law purports to leave unimpaired

all "vested rights," it regulates both existing and unused
. h ts to water. 3
rig

The Iowa law requires that all substantial uses of
water be "beneficiaL" That term is defined to mean the
application of water to a useful purpose enuring to the
benefit of the water user and subject to his dominion and
control.

4

Permits are issued by the Water Commission.

These permits have a general limitation of ten years, and
the law prohibits the diversion, storage, or withdrawal of
water for most substantial uses from any natural watercouril!i
underground basin or watercourse, drainage ditch, or
settling basin (except for ordinary household purposes and
use for domestic animals) without a permit.

5

The Water

Commissioner may suspend the operation of permits if
necessary during an emergency, establish priorities for
water distribution, and thus protect the public interest
from danger.

6

The statute directs that the standard for determinin;
the disposition of applications is one of beneficial use
to be applied in a broad manner. 7

The commissioner has
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sought to discriminate on the basis of differences among
beneficial uses; if the applicant can show that his use
is beneficial, he will receive a permit.

The effect of this

policy, along with the abundant rainfall in the state, has
the first ten years of operation only two
applications for permits were denied.
disposition of drainage waters.

Both involved the

Not a single application

store, or withdraw water was denied during this

Maryland
Maryland's permit is administered by the Department
Water Resources, which operates within the Department
Natural Res9urces.

9

Domestic, farming and municipal

,uses are exempted from regulation, as well as water uses
'in existence on January l, 1934.

10

The Department may

· Cgrant a permit if the proposed use provides for the greatest
utilization of the waters of the state and will
general welfare.

11 Conversely, the Department

reject any proposed use that is ''inadequate, wasteful,
impracticable" or detrimental to the public
terest. 12
The permit specifies the amount of water to be used,
We 11 as th e nature an d location
·
of

13
·
t h e propose d d'1vers1on.

is no time limit on these permits, but water rights

b e reduced or lost through nonuse. 14

There is no

tion of transferability of permit rights in the Mary-
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4.

North Carolina

North Carolina enacted a comprehensive permit system
in 1967.

The act declares that it is the policy of the

state to put waters "to beneficial use to the fullest extent to which they are capable, subject to reasonable
regulation."

15

The Board of Water and Air Resources is

authorized to establish "capacity use areas" in any area
where there is such demand for surface or ground water that
regulation is necessary to protect both public and private
. t eres t s. 16
1.n

The Board may adopt regulations to conserve

both surface and ground water supplies in such areas and
permits may be required for water uses in excess of 100,000
gallons per day.

17

In determining whether to grant or deny an application,
the Board is merely required to act in the public interest.
However, section 143-215.14(h) sets forth nine guidelines
to be considered by the Board in adopting rules and regulations, considering permit applications, and acting on
revocations and modifications of permits.

The act provides

that if the applicant is able to prove that he was using
water prior to the date of the declaration of a capacity
use area and the Board finds that the use was "reasonably
necessary," it must grant a permit as long as the use will
not adversely affect existing or potential public and priV"
. th e area. 18
uses 1.n

Moreover, in granting a permit, the

Board is directed to consider the prior investments of
person in the land or plans made for utilizing water in
connection with such land.

19

Permits may be granted for (1) ten years,

(2) the
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duration of the existence of the capacity use area, or
(3) the period found by the Board to be necessary for
reasonable amortization of the applicant's water with20
.
f aci'l'ities.
.
drawal or water-using

1 h oug h permits
'
At

may be renewed, they are subject to modification or revocation upon not less than 60 days' notice to the permit
holder.

Water rights under the permit system are not
21
transferable without the Board's approval.
Consumptive Water Use Regulation in Other Eastern States

!

i

i

!

A number of other riparian jurisdictions have created
consumptive use permit systems.

These include Delaware,

Minnesota, New Jersey, South Carolina, and WisOf these, the Florida act is by far the most com-

Delaware
Delaware's water use regulation, enacted in 1966
administered by the Department of Natural Resources
Environmental Control.
'''water are covered.

22

Both surface and ground

Existing uses are exempted from con-

use regulation, but the act provided that ''no
in the amount of water used shall be made be a
user without prior approval of the Department."

23

re are also exemptions for domestic and agricultural uses
well as some municipal uses.

24

The time limit on the permits is uncertain and the
terminate any permit when the water use exercised
is no longer deemed to be ''reasonably beneficial.'

025
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Water rights
suspended if a water
In that event, water is allocated

by the governor.

provided that

le

ty

accord:ilng to a

water first be used to sustain life, thGn to maintain
\,1ealt.l:1~

health, and then to

26

Permit rights

~7

the age11cy ~ £,

may be transferred with the
2.

Florida
The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 established

an elaborate structure for the
rights. 28

istration of water

sible for the· implementation

Primarily re

of the act, the Division of Interior Resources asserts
broad authority over surveyr research, and investigation
29 The statute
into all aspects of water use and q:1.1ality,,
a. corrrpreb.e11sive

also requires the Division to f

1
sate
wa t er pan.
t

30

There are eight criteria by which

the plan is to be developed, each keyed to a different
The Act provides

use to cover all poss

that the state ,,i?ate:r:· tlse. t)la:n car1n.ot. be a,dopt.ed or modif
a public

without first

The Act cre;sit.es fi 1IE; 1,,n::1.t.er districts CI.is;vic1ed accord-

The governing boards

ing to

resident members

of the di
are authori
enginee1~s I

anO.

is to ac·t on,

t

modify, or

a

applic

34

In order to issue,

but in an emergency the board may issue orders that are
be immediate

com pl

with.

The affected
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require a hearing by the board.
The common-law rules of riparian rights are almost
entirely negated by the 1972 act, and except for domestic
use, all other uses must be by permit.

36

Existing riparian

users are not entitled to permits as a matter of right
but they are given a preferential right to them. 37
Permit applications must demonstrate that the
proposed use is a reasonable-beneficial one, will not
interfere with any presently existing legal use, and
is consistent with the public interest.

38

"Reasonable-

beneficial use" is defined to mean ''the use of water in
such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient
utilization for a purpose and in a manner which is both
reasonable and consistent with the public interest.• 39
The act created the following permit classifications:
(1) consumptive use (2) wells (3) storage and impoundments
(4) wast discharges (5) discharges into aquifiers,

The

application must contain the identity of the applicant,
source of the water supply, quantity applied for, nature
. t
Of propose d use, an d poin

40
'
o f d'iversion.

If the use

is to be less than 150,000 gallons per month, no hearing
is required if no objections are filed.

41

To accommodate competing applications, the Department of Natural Resources can modify the applications
to minimize conflict.

42

If two applications are other-

wise equal, perference is to be given to renewal applications over initial applications.

43
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A permit may be issued for any period of time up to
twenty years, but a permit may be issued for fifty years
if the permittee is a municipailty, public works, or
.
.
.
44
pu bl ic service corporation.

Also, a permit may be

modified or renewed prior to the expiration date.

In

addition, the act provides for permit revocation in five
situations:

45

(1) when the permittee makes a materially

false statement on the application,
of permit conditions,
the act,

(2) wilful violation

(3) violation of any provision of

(4) non~use for two consecutive years,

(5) per-

mittee consent.
The Department is to formulate a plan of classificatir;1;
to determine which users are to be given priority of use
during periods of water shortage.

46

"Shortage" within the

meaning of the act exists when there is insufficient water
to satisfy permit requirements, or when reduction in water
use is necessary to protect water sources from serious ha.
3.

Minnesota
In Minnesota, the Comrtlission of Natural Resources

supervises the use and allocation of surface and underground water.

48

Under the Minnesota statute any person,

including state agencies, must acquire a permit to use
water, unless the use is specifically exempted.

49

Riparian rights existing at the time of the statutorf
enactment are specifically exempted from permit requirem
Further exempted is any domestic use serving less then
twenty-five persons, any beneficial use in existence on
July 1, 1973 outside a municipality, and any beneficial
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in existence prior to July 1, 1959 within a municipal
boundary.

51

To acquire a permit a prospective user must submit
application to the Commission; a copy must also be
'sent to the director of the watershed district.

52

Acting

twenty days, the commissioner must grant a permit
use is practical and in the public interest.

53

A

can be rejected if the proposed use would be
wasteful or dangerous.

54

A hearing is not mandatory un-

an interested party files notice demanding one.

55

Any party in interested may appeal the commissioner's
to the county court within thirty days.

56

The

appeal is tried on the record; the commissioner's findings
of fact are prima facie evidence of the matter therein, and
orders are deemed prima facie reasonable.

57

Since state waters may not be utilized without a
;;permit, the legislature has estal;>lished a category of
use priorities.

Rules governing the allocation

potential users are to be enacted in 197s.

58

The stated priorities upon which the rules are to be
as follows:

first priority, domestic supply

municipal but including agricultural irrigation
consumption of less than 10,000 gallons per day;
'liiecond, any use that involves consumption of less than
,000 gallons per day; third, power production; fourth,
commercial uses; fifth, other use involving
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consumption of more than 10,000 gallons per day. 59
Although statutory provisions exist for determining
use preference among competing applicants there is no
definition of the rights of permittee as against the
rights of a riparian owner; and there is no mechanism
for allocation of the resource in times of scarcity.
4.

New Jersey
New Jersey's comprehensive permit system, applicable

to both surface and ground water is administered by the
Water Policy and Supply Councii.

60

The regulations,

however, only apply to those areas of the state where
the Council determines that the surface or ground water
resources need to be protected.

61

In areas where the

permit system has been implemented, no person may divert
or use surface water in excess of 70 gallons per minute
for any private use, other than a reasonable domestic
use, without obtaining a permit.

62

A permit is also

required in such areas for extraction of ground water
in excess of 100, 000 gallons per day.

63

However, existing

surface water uses are given priority and existing ground
.

.

water uses are exempted f rom the permit requirement.

64

Surface water permits may be granted for any period
up to 25 years. 65

·
There are no provisions ·for revocation

or transfer of permits, or for suspension of water rights
during periods of water shortage.
5.

South Carolina
There are no consumptive use controls for surface

water in south Carolina, but since 1969 the Water Resour
..,A

Planning and Coordinating Commission has regulated grou,,~
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water. 66

The Commission is authorized to establish

•capacity use areas'' and require permits in such areas for
water users who withdraw more than 100,000 gallons per
day. 67

Permits for nonconsumptive uses may be granted with-

out a hearing, but one is required where a consumptive use

.
1 ve.
d 68
is invo
In determining whether to grant a permit for a consumptive use, the commission may consider the number of
persons using an aquifer and the extent, object, and
necessity of their withdrawals; the nature and size of
the aquifer; any physical and chemical impairment of the
water which may affect its use for other purposes, ineluding public use; the severity and duration of such
impairment; the injury to the public health, safety, or
welfare which might result if such impairment were not
abated; the kinds of activities to which the various uses
are related; the importance and necessity of the claimed
uses; the effect upon other watercourses or ~quifers;
''any other relevant factors.••

69

Permits may issued for up to 10 years, or the
duration of the existence of the capacity use area, or
a period sufficient to amortize the applicant's water
withdrawal and water use facilities.

70

Although permits

may be renewed, there are no specific standards connected
with renewals.

The Commission may also modify or revoke

any permit after appropriate notice, provided that such
the public interest.

71

Permits are trans-

ferable with the approval of the Corruuission and there are
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no special provisions for dealing with temporary water
shortages.
6.

72

Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, the Division of Environmental Protect 1·

on,

a part of the state Natural Resources Board, is the primary
agency for administering state water laws, including water
quality control, irrigation permits, and permits for diversion.

The legislature enacted a limited permit system

in 1935 after a severe drought.

74

The act was amended in

1967 and 1969, and provided for diversion of surplus water
from a stream to maintain the water level of any navigable
lake or stream.

Non-surplus water may be diverted for

punposes of agriculture or irrigation "but no water shall
be diverted to the injury of public rights in the stream
or to the injury of any riparian located on the stream"
unless consent is given. 75
A permit is required for either agriculture or
.
. t.ion. 76
irriga

The application must state times of di-

77
.
1
.
version,
amoun t s, an d pace
o f d'iversion.

The permit

must be issued if surplus water exists, or if there is
no surplus water, when affected riparians have consented,

r5

The Department is required to review annually all permits
issued since 1957.

A permit may be revoked if the per-

mitted use if found to be detrimental to other riparians.
Iron ore mining has been declared to be in the public
interest, and water can be diverted for this consumptive
because it is a "public purpose", and a permit must be
applied for.

80

The water can be transported to another
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watershed where the operations occur.

81

Further,

in passing on the application, the Department weighs
the public rights in the stream against the public
benefits from the mining.

The legislature has further

declared that persons engaged in mining must be assured
of adequate and continuous supplies of water before large
capital investments are made for mills or plants.
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In

upon an application for a permit for the diversion
of consumptive use of water for mining, the Department
must weigh the public rights in the stream which may be
adversely affected, against the public benefits which will
from the proposed operation outweigh the public
in the stream, the permit is to be issued.

Only

riparians within the area of prospective injury are entitled to notice and hearing on the mining water use
.
.
83
app 1 1cat1.on.

An injured riparian owner may contest the

·,,issuance at the hearing, or he may within three years
.
'
ac t 1.on
o f inverse
con d emna t'1.on.

84

The consent

riparian owners is not, however, required in order
have a permit issued.

In addition, applicant is en85
condemn adversely affected riparian rights.

98

C.

The Constitutionality of State Consumptive Water Use
Regulations
--The primary goal of any shift in water law would be to

fully control water resources to acheive maximum beneficial
use by creating an administration and permit system to regulate water use, impoundments, and to control flooding.
The major problem lies not in organizational structure
and procedure, however, but in the constitutional objection
to taking water use property rights from existing riparian
users without just compensation.

Precisely, water regulation

is either a taking, constitutionally requiring compensation,
or it is a valid exercise of state police power, in which
case no compensation is required.

Although every attempt

to regulate use of property is in a sense a ''taking" and
"necessarily speaks as a prohibition,•
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police power

measures relating to the use of property tend to impair
or destroy those interests included in the general concept
of property.

87

State attempts to abrogate or alter the

existing riparian doctrine of water use rights have met
with stiff opposition, both at public forums and in the
courts, and it can only be assumed that the same opposition
83
will accur in any other state attempting a similar change.
1.

Riparian Rights as Property
Of particular concern in any attempt to establish

an understanding of the relationship between the police
power and riparian rights is the property nature of

99

~tparian use itself.

A riparian right to water is a right

use of the water, not a right to the corpus of the
In addition, the property interest in the riparian
has been recognized in three distinct areas, the
of access to water, the right to continued flow of
ter, and the right to use of the water.

89

Justice Story early declared that riparian owners,
not the general public, were the possessors of rights
of watercourses and the use of water:
stream existing

"The

for the benefit of the land

which it flows, is an incident annexed, by oration of law, to the land itself.••

90

Justice Story's

inion reflects the traditional nineteenth century view
at a property right is an independent and isolated enand that an owner may do with his property rights
wished, subject only to the restrictions of common
nuisance and trespass doctrines.
Although remnants of this notion still appear
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the

and is toward a more flexible notion of property rights
gives the public a vested interest in property use
in certain instances equals or surpasses the private
This is evidenced in changing judicial and legattitudes toward the nature of land as a concept.
longer is the idea generally accepted that land's only
is to enable the owner to make a profit from its
to use it in a way that might be harmful to the
public interest. 93

Indeed, the new attitude is

in state legislation protecting natural areas
for regulation of development.

94

This represents

100

a policy of integrating both public and private interests
in establishing a "best use" of natural resourced, a supposition almost entirely antagonistic to Justice Story's
opinion.
Once the property factor in riparian use is seen in
an interdependent network of competing uses, "an amended
concept of property rights suggests a reformulation of the
law of takings.••

95

The new doctrine of public rights and

interest provides a contervailing measure which would
validate legislation as a police power regulation rather
than classify the legislation as an exercise of eminent
domain requiring compensation.
declared:

As one commentator has

96

Although the simple right to the use of
water may be a property right, there remains
the substantial problem of whether the elaborate
legal doctrine which the courts have formulated
to govern the enjoyment of the usufructury right
can itself be described as property.
In this instance, however, the very fact of
judicial silence seems to be evidence that they
are not property.
This suggests that a property right exists in usufructury use, but that a similar property right does not exist
in the judicial rules promulgated to define and protect
riparian uses.

By analyzing the property interest se-

parately in this manner, legislative alteration of the
existing legal structure supporting water use may not be
as fraught with constitutional snages as at first glance,
Nevertheless, judicial rules and the uses they protect are
not entirely inseparable, and an attack on one invariably

..........______________...,
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an attack on the other.

However, the advantage of

'ewing riparian rights from such a perspective diminishes
~

concept of usufructury use from the traditional status
a full property right to something less, a quasi-property
such a reduction provides additional weight to the
position that modification or termination of riparian
hts by regulation is a valid exercise of police power.
The Taking Issue
The recent literature and court cases attest to
judicial efforts to employ a meaningful and contest for determining where police power measures
97
compensation for loss of use of property.
No
tests have been listed and described
the commentators.

98

Characterized by minimum pred-

ability, the decisional law is confusing, rhetorical
patternless. 99

In addition, since courts are aware

of a firm taking test, judicial statements
prefaced by the caveat that each case must be
11

Before a court can properly apply a test to determine
or not an exercise of police power constitutes
domain or regulation, the relationship between
police power and the area involved must be examined
see if that area is outside the circumscribed bounds
legitimate police activity.

Having been developed to

lude everything essential to the public health, safety,

I

I'

102

and welfare to permit state interference whenever demanded
by the public interest, the standard for constitutional review of police power legislation was delivered in 1894:100
To justify the state in interposing its
authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of
the public.
.require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive on
individuals.
After considering whether the regulation falls within
an appropriate area of police power concern, the court must
examine the legislative means adopted to effectuate the
regulatory intent.

Using a test of rational relationship,

courts are reluctant to question legislative wisdom, and
unless "no state of facts could exist to justify such a
statute", the statute is presumptively valid and shielded
from judicial inquiry.

101

Since the criteria of public purpose and rational
relationship of legislative means to ends have been exeluded almost entirely from judicial consideration, the
third area laid down in Lawton v. Steele of individual
regulatory burden has become the nucleus of the dispositve
constitutional test.

This burden most often has been

translated into economic loss in the form of a diminutionin-value test.
Most state police power regulations that restrict
property or activity impose little or no observable econom~
loss on those regulated, and the regulations are generallY
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assailable if they do not substantially erode private
operty values.
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In addition, when economic loss re-

from regulation and there is the high public inerest in having the activity curtailed, then the element
general welfare validates the regulation.

The cat-

of such cases stretches over a broad spectrum of
activities from alcohol production and prostitution 104
·
of trash. 105
the out d oor b urning

On th e o th er h an,
d

vironmental land use regulations are prone to constitutional
only because they seek to prevent cost exrnalizations that courts do not customarily recognize,
also because they drastically curtail the market value

t

private property, posing a sharp constitutional conflict
.
.
.106
private
interests.

. ' l ar l y, any
Simi

of consumptive riparian uses would diminish
.rketable land value, create a new legal category for
and be an unrecognized and hypothetical public

Physical Invasion Test
The Supreme Court first expanded the notion of police
government intrusion on the absolute107
Ss of private property, in the case of Mugler v. Kansas.
Mugler opinion stands for the constitutional proposition
t

police power regulations do not constitute compensable
no direct governmental appropriation

the property, where use is absolutely impaired, and where

104

the regulation has a significant relationship to the public
welfare.

108

Mugler amplied a position taken earlier by Mr.

Justice Harlan stating that "taking" was necessarily concomitant with acquiring possession or title to that which
was regulated.
(b)

109

Harm-Benefit and Diminution-In-Value Tests
While Mr. Justice Harlan viewed the difference between

a police power regulation upon property use and the public
taking of property as a difference in the kind regulation,
Mr. Justice Holmes viewed the distinction as one of degree.
Announcing the doctrinal transition in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,

110

Holmes created a new set of criteria by

. h to JU
. d get h e issue:
.
111
wh ic
One consideration in determining whether .limitations
on private property, to be implied in favor of the
police power, are exceeded, is the degree in which
the values incident to the property are diminished
from the facts of the particular case.
The general rule, at least, is that if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking
for which compensation must be paid.
In determining whether there has been a diminution
in values incident to property under the police
power as to require an exercise of eminant domain
and the payment of compensation, the greatest
is given to the judgment of the legislature, but
is always open to interested parties to contend
the legislature has gone beyond its juristictional
power.
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition
is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the charge.
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Because of the crucial significance of this decision as
genesis of all subsequent taking cases, the background and
case are worth examining.

The case concerned the

coal fields and the tendency of mine shafts to
lapse when abandoned.

Termed mine subsidence, the effect

to remove support from under towns and cities of the
hracite region.

The Pennsylvania legislature responded to

problem by passing the Kohler Act of 1921, which made unlawthe mining of coal so as to cause the subsidence of any
'lding, structure, or transportation route within the limits
a designated class of municipalities.
Mahon and his wife resided in one of these restricted
Forty years earlier the coal company had owned the
on which they lived but the company subsequently
surface rights to another party, who in turn sold to
1917.

The original deed and Mahon's contained a

of mineral rights by the coal company and included
of any future claim against the coal company for
injury or property damages.
permanent injunction.

Mahon brought suit seek-

Holmes, reversing the Pennsylvania

declared the Kohler Act unconstitutional and

Applying a balancing test of extent of public harm if
area is left unregulated against the diminution in value
thing if regulated, Holmes stated that the effect on the
would be slight if the act were invalid and that the
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value of the coal company's reserves, if the act were valid

'
would be reduced beyond an acceptable level.

In other wora

s'
"if the result of the regulation is to achieve a benefit for

the community, compensation must be paid; but if it is to
terminate a harmful activity, no compensation is necessary.
Furthermore, implicit in the harm-benefit analysis lies the
concept of reciprocity -- that the regulation is justifiable
so long as those regulated share to some degree in the benefit*
of the restriction.

113

Harm and benefit may be regarded as opposite sides of
the same coin, but harm imposed by private property use prov'
an obvious judicial analog to nuisance, and therefore becomes more readily acceptable as part of any balancing equati~;
When police power relies on the nuisance factor

(eliminating

a public harm), the economic value of the activity can be
virtually destroyed,

114

but if the activity is not a nuisancf

or can not be characterized as spillover (or producing public
harm), then the traditional test of diminution-in-value is
used, combined with the factor of extent to which the property
can be put to some other use, not necessarily the most profitable.115

This analysis posits the doctrine that no pro-

perty rights exist in a nuisance or spillover-producing
activity.
Using the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal as a touchstone, the courts began to validate police power regulations
in land and property use areas whenever public health, safeey

107

general welfare demanded.

The result produced many

'isions which sought to determine the degree or perthat could be imposed upon property owners
compensation was necessary.

116

A particular

in the inability of courts to arrive at a
ridard definition of property base for the diminition
"The degree of loss inquiry apparently attempts
personal burden imposed upon property owners,
/ it does so only by viewing arbitrary subdivisions of
.

hol d ings.

.,118

If a court views only the reg-

restricted part of an area, it will necessarily
that there is a greater percentage loss than if
the entire area.

For example, substantial di-

may be sustanied in an attack on riparian regtion if intense development of an unregulated area is
On the other hand, if the diminution evaluation
an entire area, regulated and unregulated, an
property base may compel invalidation
regulation. 119
Seldom, however, does a court only consider either the
'nution-in-value or the harm-benefit approach in its
the taking problem.

More often the inquiry es-

balance between private loss and public interest,
two tests together.

Public interest, further-

, has been couched in terms of preventing public harm
just any interest the public might have, which may
be defined to include benefits.

The definitional

120
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relationship between the regulation and the thing regulated

'
then, returns to that given by Holmes in Pennsylvania Coa1.
substantial diminution can occur through regulation if nonregulation would produce a public harm.

In addition, police

power concerns more than just noxious uses of private
property.

Zoning, for instance, relies on police pdwer to

regulate the compatible location of non-noxious uses by establishing "enforcible priorities between incompatible uses
in the interest of the general welfare.•
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In like manner,

as the need becomes recognized as it was in zoning, a legislature may choose to establish water use priorities.
{c)

The Residuum Test
A corollary approach to the standard diminution test

provides an alternative perspective for viewing degree of
loss imposed by gegulation.

The residuum test has two

variants, each of which may yield a different result.

If

a court looks only to residual beneficial use left after
regulation, so that the land may have a number of economically
profitable uses (even if marginal and/or inconsistent with
prior use), the regulation may be upheld as a valid exercise
.
122
o f t h e po 1 ice power.

However, if the residual use is

viewed in terms of reasonable rate of return for permitted
remaining uses, taking into account prior use, surrounding
uses, amd market conditions, a court may determine that the
regulation has taken too much and may require that compensat
be paid.

109

Which branch of the residuum test to employ rests with
e perceived relationship of the regulated activity to the
blic interest.

As the first residuum approach permits

of an encroachment on private property, and hence more
taking without compensation, that test should be ulized when non-regulation would result in public harm,
t by defining public interest in terms of "harms", ex123
.
fl exi'b'l't
.
t o po l'ice power regu 1 ation.
·
aordinary
i i y can b e given
e other approach relies more heavily on market profitability
remaining uses.

If the residual use can not realize a

return, then the regulation is invalid.

Sign-

such factors as public harm and externalization
sts are afforded minimum weight in this analysis, while
component of private property is given great consideration.
This second of the residum approaches tends to parallel
implicit property right definition, but the
private property, without the internalization
costs, even if the externalization is a public
an anachronism in an era when the public interest
,s become critically involved with private resources usage.
ever, not_ al]'. takings question should be decided by the
test of the first residuum approach.

All public

(or benefits) do not necessarily outweigh private
If the contrary were so, and as Plater suggests,
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state would prevail in every instance of confrontation.
necessity, the residuum approach must be subjective in
the delicate balance between public interest
institution of private property.

110

(d)

The Diminution-Balancing Test
The movement in analysis and theory of the taking

problem evidences a definite shift toward an economic per125 ·
. t e 1 ass an d pu bl'ic gain
' are
.
spec t ive,
in wh'ic h priva
quantified according to real loss or gain, administrative ,
and demoralization costs.

But the economic analysis is not

an end in itself; rather, it provided a frame of reference
from which to view a complex issue.

With the added factor

of fairness, this economic diminution-balancing approach
avoids the paradoxes of a harm-benefit approach and accounts
for societal need not explicit in the diminution test.

This

test proposes minimum total social costs while recognizing
"both the costs that private uses impose upon the public
and individual losses that government action causes." 126
The judicial inquiry requires two steps to determine
if compensation is necessary.

First, no private loss is

excessive if, balanced against the public, it is less than
the costs it would impose on others, whether public costs
resulting from unrestricted uses exceed or are less than
.

private property losses caused by government regulations.

127

The suggestion here goes to the nature of private property
rights in relation to public rights:

that a public trust

doctrine operates to control the property rights distribution
wherever the public and private conflict and public costs
.
128
are greater tan
h
private costs.

In economic terms,

111

test imposes internalization costs on a private property
er whose use of his property can be classified as a harmexternality.
"The first stage inquiry is only minimum review, and
converse proposition that any regulation imposing more
it prevents is ipso facto invalid does not
Further, excessiveness of individual loss
measured solely in terms of contervailing public
When private loss is less than public gain, the
stage dimininution analysis may still be controlled
question of fairness when combined with the utilitarian
first part of the test.
Certainly it must be emphasized that none of these
ories alter or remove the necessity for compensation
n government exercises its power of eminant domain and
'ns actual title to property, when regulations are arrary or unreasonable,
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or when private loss so out-

ghs public gain that an obvious inequite would result.
h alternative test provided a constitutional safeguard
private property rights while recognizing that the public
a vested interest in the use of private property.
The Constitutionality of Changes in Water Law Systems
In the past, because of the important relationship of

r to the public welfare, the United States Supreme Court
generally upheld state regulation of water based on the
131
ice power.
The Court has rejected the assertion that

112

each riparian owner has a vested right in the use of unimpaired and uncontaminated flowing waters and instead has
held that every state is free to change its law governing
riparian ownership and to permit the allocation of flowing
waters for such purposes as it may deem best. 132
A number of state courts have also upheld systems
altering the existing uses of riparian owners.

The Kansas

Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 133 upheld
the validity of that state's new appropriation law against
the objection that the property of riparian owners was taken
without due process of law.

The court indicated that the

rights of the riparian owners were always subject to modificat'
by the legislature to the extent required by the conditions
an d wans
o f th e peop 1 e.
t

'
l34
.
.
I n re Hoo d River,
Li. k ewise,
in

the Oregon Supreme Court upheld sections of a statute which
redefined "vested rights" and preserved the riparian rights
only to the extent of their use at the time of its enactment
or shortly prior thereto.

The constitutionality of the Orego~

Code, regulating both used and unused rights, was upheld by
the Ninth Circuit in California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement co.

135

113

state Regulation
---

of Consumptive Water Use in Kentucky

Kentucky made the first significant legislative
hange in its riparian system in 1954.

The droughts of

he two preceding years caused many farmers to divert
from nearby streams and lakes in order to satisfy
water needs.

The increased use of riparian water
for a more satisfactory definition

riparian rights in Kentucky.

136

With this in mind,

e legislature set forth in the 1954 act a basic statement
the rights of landowners in such waters.
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The

also provided for the Legislative Research Comto make a thorough study of all problems relating
water resources and to report its findings to the 1956

The act applied to "public water" which included conined surface water and ground water, but not diffused
Section 3 of the act set forth the rights
landowners to use the public waters of the state.

The

t provided that the use of water by a riparian owner for
purposes would have priority over other uses and
that riparian owners "shall have a right to make
h reasonable use of the water for other than domestic
poses as will not deny the use of such water to other
ers for domestic purposes or impair existing uses of
heretofore established, or unreasonably inwith a beneficial use by other owners."

Finally,

allowed riparians under certain conditions to imwater on their land as long as this would
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not injure the rights of other users.
In 1966 the older act was replaced by a more comprehensive statute,

138

KRS chapter 151.

This legislation,

attempts to deal with the state's water resources on a
coordinated and comprehensive basis.

Comsumptive uses of

water, as well as the construction of dams and impoundments are gegulated by the agency.

In addition, the

legislation authorized water resources planning and construction for flood control and water development purposes.
1.

Administrative Structure
The Department for Natural Resources and Environmental

.
. .
Protection
a d ministers
t h e act. 139

Originally, the Division

of Water performed adjudicatory and planning functions.
The first five years of the Division's operation concentrated
on the gathering of data and the study of federal water
plans.

The data collected was designed to provide the

factual basis necessary to coordinate the planning for
Kentucky's water. 140

The Division's most important function

was implementation of the state's water plans, and it was
empowered to issue permits for the use of water in Kentucky.
The 1974 General Assembly transferred the Division's regulatory powers to the Department of Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection and the Commissioner of that agency,
KRS 151.330 (1) created the water Resources Authority
of the Commonwealth.

This agency consists of the governor,

115

e commissioner of Natural Resources and Environmental
otection, the secretary for finance and administration,
commissioner of health, the commissioner of commerce,
e commissioner of agriculture, the attorney general, the
department of transportation, the commissioner
fish and wildlife resources, and the commissioner of
The Authority is "empowered to coordinate the proof all state agencies in the conservation, developand wise use of public water,"

143

and to simultane-

"promote the beneficial and proper distribution of
throughout the state."

144

A special revolving trust fund, known as the Water
Fund, has been established, from which the Water
Authority is authorized to make loans and expendures.

145

The loans are available to any county,

city,

er district, watershed conservance district, or other
vernmental subdivision, 146 their interest is determined
the Authority, and they must be secured. 147

In addition,

Authority is authorized to issue revenue bonds for the
pose of paying all or part of such projects.

148

Another important function of the Water Resources Auity is to contract with agencies of the federal govern, primarily the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in order

.
149
. f e d era 1 reservoirs.
supp 1 y space in
The Department for Natural Resources and Environmental
ection and the Water Resources Authority are only two
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of the many governmental agencies which affect the use and
development of water resources in Kentucky.

The governor's

cabinet possesses some planning responsibility over water
resources at the state level,

150

while a variety of in-

stitutions exercise authority at the local levei.
2.

151

Consumptive Use Permits
In its declaration of policy, the Kentucky Water

Resources Act declares that "The advancement of the safety,
happiness and welfare of the people and the protection of
property require that the power inherent in the people be
utilized to promote and to regulate the conservation,
development and most beneficial use of the water resources.
It is hereby declared that the general welfare requires that
the water resources of the Commonwealth be put to the beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable,
that waste or nonbeneficial use of water be prevented,
and that the conservation and beneficial use of water be
exercised in the interest of the people. 11152
This policy is implemented by a permit system by
which the Department regulates diversions and consumptive
. wa t er. 153
uses o f pu bl 1c

According to KRS 151.120 (1)

"public waters" include "[w]ater occuring in any stream,
lake, ground water, subterranean water or other body of
water in the Commonwealth which may be applied to any
useful or beneficial purpose.''

However, neither diffused

surface water, as defined in KRS 151.100 (5), or water
left standing in pools in a natural stream when the floW

of
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. wa t ers. 154
d are regar d e d as pu bl ic
stream has cease,
KRS 151.140 declares that ''no person, business, industry,
f

country, water district, or other political subdivision''

withdraw, divert or transfer public water unless a permit
first obtained form the Department.

Permit application

'cedures are simple and expeditious.

Fermi ts are usually

'ued after an inspection by the agency to determine whether
applicant's proposed use is consistent with the statutory
irements.
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When the circumstances warrant, the Depart-

may allow less water than the applicant requested, and
be amended by either the Department or the permittee.
151.180 provide that "any person aggrieved" by an order,
~rmination, regulation or ruling of Department personnel
appeal to the Commissioner.
quasi-judicial hearing.

This proceeding calls for a

Public notice must be given and

hearing is open to the public.
enas, administer oaths,

The Department may issue

and examine witnesses.

On the

s of the evidence produced at the hearing, the Commissioner
findings of facts and conclusions of law and enters a
order.

The Water Resources Act also provides

judicial review by the agency under KRS 151. 18 0.

The

of this review, however, is limited, and findings of
by the agency are conclusive if supported by substantial

There is some question as to what parties can seek adstrative or judicial review under the provisions of KRS
80 and 151.190.

Clearly, one whose application for a
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permit is rejected or substantially modified could make
such an appeal.

Arguable, exempted riparian users as Well

as existing permit holders would also have standing as
"aggrieved persons'' since their interests are specifically
protected by the statute.

157

It is less clear whether

another applicant whose permit has not yet been granted can
avail himself of these provisions to challenge the pending
permit application of another.

Finally, it is uncertain~

what extent other governmental agencies, conservation
organizations or private citizens may qualify as "aggrieved
persons" in order to protect public interests within the
purview of the statute. 158
Once a permit is issued, the water user must keep
accurate records of all water withdrawn, diverted or transferred and submit periodic reports to the Department. 159
The agency, may after warning, order the suspension or revocation of a permit if the owner fails to comply with the
conditions of his permit or with provisions of the Act of
.
160
re 1 ate d or d ers, rues
1
or regu 1 ations.

The Department

may enforce the provisions of the Act in a number of ways.
The Department has general authority to adopt rules and
161 an d to issue
.
.
regu 1 ations
or d ers 162 to carry ou t th e
provisions of the Act.
The Department may issue a cease and desist order agai
one who makes a withdrawal, diversion or transfer of public
water without obtaining the necessary permit.

163

r~f

The agen~,

may also institute court proceedings to enforce its orders,
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reover, unauthorized diversions of public water,

165

as

ll as other violations of the Act, may subject the viocivil penalties of up to $1000 per day. 166
The scope of the Department's regulatory power over
blic water is substantially limited by a series of extions found in KRS 151.140.

These include (1) domestic

(2) agricultural users, including irrigators;
s exempted by administrative regulation;

(3)

(4) stream gen-

plants; and (5) water injected undergrouns in conwith oil and gas production.
The exemption for domestic use reflects the high priorgiven to such uses under riparian doctrine.

KRS 151.100

''domestic use" as ''the use of water for ordinary
purposes, and drinking water for poultry, livedomestic animals.''

Domestic uses are often ex-

. .is
.
. Eastern states 167 b ecause it
regu 1 ation
in
en impractical to regulate numerous small users; individdomestic users collectively account for a relatively
11 amount of the total water demand; and regulation of
icipal waterworks and other public water suppliers can
168
ectively control domestic consumption in urban areas.
The exemption for agriculture is more significant.
in 1970 averaged about seven million
25,000 acres of land.

169

Tobacco is

principal crop using irrigation waters, and if a drought
occurs, some 36,000 acres would require 4,320,000,000
of water. 170

Maryland is the only other state which

1.2 0

specifically exernpts

useso

171

In Kentucky

the exemption is due larg·ely to the efforts of the Farm
Bureau which viev1s

farm activities.

ir1i th

extreme alarm any regulation of

Nevertheless, this exemption is a major

weakness in the regulatory scheme.
No permit is req11ired

11

if t.he a.n1ount of water rNith-

drawn, diverted or transferred is less than the amount
established by regulation.''

This exemption was created as

a result of an amendment in 1974 to KRS 151.140 requested
by the agency.

T'l'1e age.ncy n.otv exempt.s from the pe~r:-mi t

system those who use less than 10,000 gallons per day.
Similar provisions appear in Iowa and Florida water reg,
.
172
ulatory legislation.

The 1966 act orginally exempted many manufacturing
and industrial users from the permit requirements, provided
that the water was returned in substantially the same quan'::
and condition. as vit1en it v1a s wi thclrav,1n ~

This provision wss

repealed in 1972, leaving only stream-generating facilities
still exempt.

Finally, the use of water for secondary recovery operations con·tir1u.es t~o 1.~eraair1 e·:Kemp·t fro1n the permit requirements~
The exact nature of a water right under Kentucky's
permit system is somewhat unclear.

For purposed of il

tion, it will be compared with water rights under the
common-lav1 ripa.rian_ syste1n and pr·ior appropriation.
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In the East, surface water rights are based on ownerof riparian land and rights to ground water arise
the ownership of overlying land.

Under prior appropriat-

rights are derived from beneficial use of the
no t

. 173
1 an d owners h ip.

In Kentucky, beneficial

'se rather than ownership of land, appears to be the basis
the permit right.

KRS 151.170 states that no permit
a responsible applicant who has es-

blished an amount of water for which he has a need for
purpose."

There is no requirement in the statute

applicant be a riparian or overlying owner.

In

dition, municipalities, which are considered nonriparians
are specifically mentioned as eligible
Moreover, the statute does not suggest that
or overlying owners are to be given any preference
the granting of permits.
applied:

A modified watershed rule,

KRS 151.200 (2) provides that permits

a use beyond the watershed must be authorized
the Water Resources Authority.
The riparian right is usufructory in nature.

The

ter user merely has the right to make a reasonable use
the available surface water.

Under each of three

on law" ground water doctrines, the water right is
Under prior appropriation, however,
water right is much more specific.

The appropriator's

t i s fixed in terms of time, location and quantity.
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Each of these prior appropriation features is found in the
Kentucky statute.

KRS 151.170 (1) provides that permits

be specific in terms of quantity, time, place and rate of
diversion, transfer, or withdrawal.
Water rights under the prior appropriation system are
perpetual in nature although they can be lost or abandoned
through nonuse.

175

Riparian rights in a sense are, also

perpetual since they are appurtenant to the land.

On the

other hand, the continuing right to make a particular use
of water (except for domestic uses)

is of indefinite duratio~

under the reasonable use rule since changing circumstances
may compel an existing user to modify his water use or cease
it altogether in order to accommodate new users.

Most

permit systems in the East place durational limits on the
.
.
. d'ic renewa.
1 176
permits
an d require
perio

h Ken t uc k y
Te

statute, however, does not specify any particular time
limit, although it is doubtful that they are intended to be
perpetual.
The transfer of water rights apart from a sale of the
land is difficult or impossible in most riparian jurisdictions.

While theoretically pos~ible in prior approp-

riation states, in practice it is difficult because the
rights of junior appropriators must be protected.

177

The

Kentucky stature is silent on whether permit rights are
transferable.

Presumably the permit would have to be a-

mended pursuant to 151.170 (4)

if the place of diversion or

any other material aspect of the permit were changed as a
result of the transfer.
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preferences and priorities are two related and often
In the East temporal priority is not
Established users have no protection against
initiation of new uses.

As a general rule, there are

preferential rights to water either.

An exception to

is is the domestic user in the case of surface water.
the overlying owner to ground water are superior
those of a nonoverlying user under the American rule and
e correlative rights doctrine.

Use preferences are some-

mes found in prior appropriation jurisdictions, although
operate somewhat differently than in the East.

17 8

Priority, however, is very important under prior
In times of water shortage the rights of
nior appropriators are superior to those of junior
. t ors. 179
ropria

.
.
. a f actor un d er t h e Kentuc k y
Priority
is

t, but operate's somewhat differently than in the West.
er prior appropriation, priority determines the rewater when supply is inadequate to meet
of all users.

In Kentucky, existing users, both

and unregulated are protected from competition
Jl1

new users by the provisions of KRS 151.170 (2), which

tes that a permit application will be granted only if
proposed use "will not be detrimental to the
water users .
is available."

. rights

." and if ''the requested
Thus, temporal priority

a factor when a new user seeks to obtain a perOnce the permit is secured, however, older uses have
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inherent superiority over recently commenced uses.

In-

stead, during periods of "drought, emergency, or other
similar situations requiring a balancing of the rights and
available water between water users."

The Department, with

the approval of the Water Resources Authority,

"may temp-

orarily allocate the available public water supply among
water users and restrict the water withdrawal rights of
permit holders until such time as the condition is relieved
and the best interests of the public are served.''lBO

This

approach differs from both riparianism and prior appropriatfo~.··
Under the former, adjustments among users would be make
according to the dictates of the reasonable use rule; under
the prior appropriation system, allocation would be made
on the basis of relative priority.
The relationship between permit users and unregulated
riparian users is uncertain in many respects.

This promises

to be troublesome because there are a great number of unregulated users in Kentucky due to the many exempted categories in KRS 151.140.
What happens when an unregulated riparian owner increases his water use, or makes a new use, and this interferes with a permitee?

For example, if a farmer begins to

make a withdrawal of water for purposes of irrigation, an
unregulated use, is his right to the water superior to that
accofit''
of the permittee if insufficient water is available to

modate fully the needs of both users?

If it is determined

that unregulated users have a preferential right to the
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ter, permit users who are also riparian to a watercourse
uld be worse off under the statutory allocation framework
common law riparian doctrine.

Arguably, this

a taking of property without due process
law.
on the other hand if permit holders are given superior
hts to the water unregulated riparian users might raise
process issue.

A compromise might be proposed

both the permitee and the riparian user must adjust
water use in accordance with the reasonable use rule.
ile this approach seems viable, it is not without problems.
the permit user is making a nonriparian use, he might
argue that his riparian rights have been impaired,
at common law, a nonriparian use is unreasonable and
be enjoined when it harms a riparian user.

On the other

d, if both the permit user and the unregualted user
riparian owners, the utility of the permit system itbe questioned since water allocation formula
be the same under the statutory system as under
riparian system.
Conflicts between regulated and unregulated users
to be most acute during periods of prolonged
water shortage conditions.

During such periods,

151.200 (1) allows the Department, with the permission
Water Resources Authority, to suspend the operation
permit system and temporarily allocate water on some
r

(but disclosed) basis.

This provision states that the
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Department may "allocate the available public water supply
among water users" and "restrict the water withdrawal rights
of permit holders"

(emphasis supplied) .

This language is

ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent unless "water users" is
interpreted as being synonymous with "permit holders."

This

view is supported by KRS 151.140 which states that "nothing
herein shall interfere with the use of water for agricultural
and domestic purposed including irrigation."

This language

suggests that the entire act, including the provisions of
KRS 151.200 (1), are inapplicable to these two exempted
categories.

However, KRS 151.140 merely states that ''no

permit shall be required" for other classes of exempt uses
such as small uses, stream generation and oil and gas
production.

Conceivably, the Department may have some

authority to regulate these uses under KRS 200

(1) during

periods of water shortage.
On the whole, the relationship between unregulated
riparian and permit users in Kentucky needs substantial
clarification.

This clarification should come from further

legislation, but may well have to be settled instead by
litigation.

Needless to say this issue is a difficult and

complex one, involving as it does the underlying proprietary
nature of both riparian ownership and statutory property
rights.
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V.

Federal Regulatory Powers Over Water Resources

A.

The Constitutional Basis of Federal Regulatory Powers
Over Water Resources
Federal regulatory authority over water resources is

based primarily on the commerce clause of the Federal
1

Constitution.

The Supreme Court first recognized the

power of the federal government to regulate navigation and
2

general commercial relations in Gibbons v. Ogden;

"The

power of Congress, then comprehends navigation within the
limit of every state in the Union, so far as that navigation
may be, in any manner, connected with 'Commerce with foreign
nations, or among the several states or with the Indian
tribes.'"

The court later stated that the power to regulate

navigation and commerce permitted the government to keep the
navigable waters free from obstructions to navigation
"imposed by the states or otherwise; to remove such obs truetions, when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions a.!
they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil
3

for the punishment of offenders.".
A line of Supreme Court decisions has expanded the
concept of navigability to allow federal regulation over a
preponderance of the United States' flowing waters.

The

first test for navigability endorsed by the court was a
factual one: if the stream was navigable in fact, it was
navigable for purposes of regulation under the commerce
4

clause.

Later the court held that nonnavigable water
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ich affected the navigable capacity of a river was also
5
and that a watercourse
ject to federal regulation,
at was nonnavigable in its natural state but capable of
made navigable by means of "reasonable improvements"
be considered navigable for jurisdictional purposes.

6

test has evolved to the point that, at the present time,
federal government has the authority to protect its
navigation in any stream, river or lake that
a channel for useful commerce, without regard for
it is navigable in its natural state, or whether it
uld be made so as a result of reasonable improvement.

7

n necessary, the federal government can override contrary
8

ate regulations.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
that just compensation be provided to the private
private property that the federal government
uisitions for public purposes.

However, the federal

"navigation servitude" on the flow of all
igable waters and does not have to recognize private
bperty interests in them.

This results without having to

ovide compensation for so doing·, and this is so irrespective
private rights in the waters are recognized by

It is no answer to say that these private owners
had interests in the water that were recognized by state
law. We deal here with federal domain, an area which Congress can completely pre-empt, leaving no vested claims that
c~nstitute 'private property' within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.
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The navigation servitude applies not only to governme
activities which directly contribute to the protection

or

maintenance of navigation, but also may extend to such
related matters as flood control or power production,
although as a practical matter Congress follows a policy of
cooperating with the states on water issues and seldom exercises the navigation servitude.
The general welfare power and the property power have
also provided constitutional bases for federal activitity
water resources areas.

Concerning the international rivers

that form boundaries with Canada and Mexico, Congress has
power to do "whatever is necessary to comply with the trea"

it makes concerning those rivers to enforce compliance by
10
its states and citizens."
Consequently, the treaty power
has been used to justify steps taken to maintain an agreed·
11
upon level of an international lake," construction of re12
and projects designed to
servoirs on boundary rivers,
carry out treaty obligations to deliver water to neighborill!)
13
countries.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congreit
the power to levy taxes "to pay tl;l.e Debts and provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United State!i,
This welfare clause has provided the justification for the
federal government construction and maintenance of reclama~
tion works and flood control projects.
Article 4, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution
known as the property clause and states:
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The Congress shall have Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in
this constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or
of any particular state.
The property clause applies mainly to unapprppriated,
-navigable waters found on public lands in western states.
the exception of Texas, the federal government at one
owned all the land, 'and the water therein, of the
When the states entered the
n, this did not affect water on public lands and conthe United States is still the owner and in
such waters.
A final possible source of federal authority is the war
It is little used for water resource purposes, but
~ennessee Valley Authority project was at least partly
ld on this basis.
Federal Water Resource Legislation
1.

The Reclamation Act

The Reclamation Act of 1902 Js the legislative foundafor reclamation projects in the United States.

This

Was designed to provide for the building of irrigation
from the proceeds of public land sales in the sixteen
The water obtained thereby was made
for use on both public and private lands.

Each

agreed to reimburse his pro rata share of the cost
nstruction in full within ten years and also to repay
lly the maintenance costs incurred from his use of the
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project.

To prevent any monopoly on precious water rights

the act provided that water could not be sold for use on

'

more than 160 acres of any one private owner's land, and the
user had to be a resident on the land.
14
appurtenant to the land.

The water rights are

The original act has been modified several times with
most revisions concerning the repayment provisions. The
15
Reclamation Project Act of 1939
provides that any costs
allocated to flood control and navigation do not have to be
.
16
reimbursed, and the Federal Water Project Recreation Act
provides that one half of the costs allocated to recreation
and fish-wildlife enhancement do not have to be reimbursed,
provided that a non-federal public body will agree to
administer the recreation, fish-wildlife aspect of the
project, pay the maintenance costs of such, and pay the
other half of the costs of the project incurred for these
purposes.
Section 7 of the original Reclamation Act provides for
the use of eminent domain in connection with federal reclamation projects, Section 8 is concerned with the role of state
17
law in relation to federal power:
That nothing in this Act shall be construed
as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way
interfere with the laws of any State Territory
relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary
of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such
laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect
any right of any state or of the Federal Govern
mentor of any landowner, appropriator, or user
of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or
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the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to
the use of water acquired under the provisions
of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis,
the measure, and the limit of the right.
section 8 has been construed by the Supreme Court as
rely requiring the United States to comply with state law
necessary to acquire water rights,

"[b]ut

e acquisition of water rights must not be confused with
18
The court later
e operation of federal projects.
restricted the extent to which state law can inreclamation projects, emphasizing that "We do not
that where Congress has provided a system of reguation for federal projects it must give way before an
19
'nconsistent state system."
Although reclamation law was originally limited to
aling with irrigation, it now applies to power production,
commercial and industrial uses, as well as to
20
and fish-wildlife conservation.
As early as
906, Congress authorized the use of reclamation water for
<ff

•

•

~- • . towns and cities on or in the immediate vicinity of
22
21
projects."
The Reclamation Project Act of 1939
the federal government.to furnish water for
nicipalities or other "miscellaneous purposes."

Most

these "miscellaneous purposes"
elude domestic and industrial supply.
Under the 1939 act, the federal government has two
contracting for municipal or other water supplies.
contract requiring repayment in a maximum of 40
interest not over 3 1/2 per cent.

(The interest

arges are in theory discretionary, but have been included

i.
...

1

!' I
, , I
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in every municipal water supply contract since 1949.) 2 3

(2)

Contract to supply water for a period not exceeding 40 y

ears
at rates at least sufficient to produce revenue adequate to
cover annual operation and maintenance costs.
The 1939 Act also provides that every contract user is
entitled to renewal of his contract, subject to renegotiatio~
of charges and other matters.

The federal government gives

an appropriative right to users during the term of their
use, "a first right to a stated share or quantity of the
project's water supply for municipal, domestic, or industrial
24
use.
11

2.

The Federal Flood Control Act of 1944

The first major federal flood control activities began
with the creations of the Mississippi River Commission in
1879

25

and the Missouri River Commission in 1884.

26

Each

commissioner was assigned the responsibility for developing
plans to improve the navigability of its respective river
and to prevent flooding.

Federal jurisdiction over flood

control matters on all navigable rivers began with the
.
27
creation of the Inland Waterways Commission in 1908.
Federal interest in flood control intensified after
extensive flooding of the Mississippi River early in the
. ti?
20th Century. The creation of the Tennessee Valley Authorl,
28
in 1933
established a new pattern of federal power over

watercourses and natural resources in order to facilitate
the full development of a specific river basin area.
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29

The Flood Control Act of 1936

designated the U.S.
I

I i

corps of Engineers as the primary federal agency in

i:
! !

dealing with flood control.

j,

This act also set forth the

I'

i

"ABC requirement" of local involvement and co-operation in
lood control projects; i.e., that no money will be approriated by the federal government unless the states furnish
30
that they will give full cooperation.
The
31
Control Act of 1944
extended the definition of
control to include channel and major drainage improveand authorized the Corps of Engineers to construct,
maintain recreation facilities in reservoir
This act also empowered the Corps to prescribe
gulations for the use of storage water allocated for flood
or navigation and to contract for the sale of surplus
The provisions of the act apply to any reservoir
with the help of federal funds.
3.

The Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention
Act of 1954.

Watershed protection encompasses the federal governt's efforts to develop small upstream projects for soil
sion prevention and flood control, as opposed to the
nt projects on major watercourses.

The primary watershed

legislation is the Watershed Protection and Flood
32
Act of 1954.
This act and its amendments set
h three ways in which the federal government, through

.s.

Department of Agriculture, may help local organizations

11

I,

I

I !I
11
_;!

i
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with small watershed projects:

(1) by giving technical

assistance in building and maintaining projects;
financial assistance;

4.

(2) giving

(3) extending long-term credit.

The Federal Water Power Act of 1920

Federal regulation of water as a power source began in
33
1896,
but piecemeal legislation was the rule until the
34
Federal Water Power Act of 1920
established a national
policy for the use and development of water power on public
35
lands and navigable streams.
The Federal Water Power Act
of 1920

established a national policy for the use and

development of water power on public lands and navigable
streams.

The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 put a firm

federal grip on water power projects by limiting licenses
for hydroelectric power developments to 50 years and by
providing for takeover by the federal government at the
36
expiration of the original licensed period.
More importantly, the Act established the Federal Power Commission,
which was later reorganized by Congress as an independent
37
The FPC has the responsibility of properly
agency.
planning and utilizying the nation's valuable water power
resources.

The Commission studies plans for proposed

federal power projects and makes recommendations.

Its main

power is its control of licensing for the use of sites
located on watercourses over which Congress has jurisdicti~',
Two provisions of the Act are of interest because of
their possible relationship to water supply.
The first is
38
that allows th FPC to license all
an amendment
a federal hydroelectric power system for non-power purpos
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d therefore conceivably for water supply purposes.

The

provides for the issuance of licenses which allow the
39
to use surplus water from a federal dam.
5. The Water Supply Act of 1958
40

The Water Supply Act of 1958

serves as the primary

majority of federal water supply and
activities.

The Act is of special importance in

is designed to look to future water needs - proare made whereby the federal government, through the
ps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, can incorporate
ditional storage into a water supply project in anticipation
future demands.

The act allows states or local interests

contract with the agency involved for storage space in a
with the stipulation that the state or
cal interest will pay for the cost of such storage space.
can be deferrred over the life of the project, up
years, and can be federally funded up to 30% of the
ject's total estimated cost.

More important, however, is

fact that the act elevated " . . • water supply from an
idental function to one of the.primary purposes of reservoir
41
struction . . . "
by the federal government.
The Water Supply Act specifically allows storage water
be contracted for by the state or local interests "for
sent or anticipated future demand or need for municipal
.
42
~ndustrial water,''
and implies that the contract water
43

used for domestic and "other purposes."

In

1961 amendment to the Federal Water Pollution
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Control Act authorizes the storage of water in federal
44
reservoirs for the purpose of water quality control, The
45
1944 Flood Control Act
expressed a change in Congressional
policy from single purpose impoundments to allowing the
fullest range of established and potential uses possible ano
since that time virtually all federal reservoir projects
have been multiple-purpose, allowing the storage water in
them to be earmarked for a variety of potential uses.

The administrative procedure for modifying the use of
water supply storage is not complicated.

Each project has

its own authorizing legislation, which usually consists of
one sentence in an amendment to a water statute.

This

leaves the agency that built the project pretty much on its
own in regard to administering the project.

Thus there are

two means by which to change the use of water stored for
water supply purposes:

Persuade the agency in charge of

project to allow the change in use; or persuade Congress to
amend the authorizing legislation.

Changing the use of

storage water involves the problems of acquiring the rights
to use the water for a different purpose; of complying with
federal and state procedures, which may lead to federalstate conflicts; of complying with various environmental
guidelines; and possible disruptions of repayment schedule,
Every federal reservoir project comes into existence as
the result of a study analyzing cost-benefit feasibilitY·
· ces
Each project, once authorized, is placed under the auspl
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of an administrator by the agency in charge of its construetion.

"'1
I,

I

I

I

Because the authorizing legislation leaves the

I I

agency that builds a project on its own as far as the adminis. tration of the project goes, the administrator will have
considerable discretion in the operation of the project.

46
i

practical matter, the administrator's primary concern
be to insure that the federal government is repaid
according to the schedule outlined for the project, and to
make the cost-benefit ratio of the project as favorable as
Indeed, the only major concern about the administration of a given project by the statute itself is that the
.
47
be repaid on time.
The easiest means by which
to change the use of water supply storage is thus to convince
administrator of the particular project involved that
proposed change in use of the water will enhance, or at
least not diminish, the cost-benefit ratio and that the
isting repayment schedule will not be unduly disrupted.
practical matter, this is probably the only way by
the use can be converted.

In theory a modification of

e authorized use could also be effected by amending the
thorizing legislation. Legislat~res are as influenced by
~nomics as administrative agencies are, however, and if
cost-benefit study renders a proposed change of use
ttractive to the administrator of a project, it will most
ely also render the change unattractive to Congress.)
There may be a problem in switching the use of concted water to a use not stipulated in the authorizing
islation of a project.

The annual appropriation for

!
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Corps flood control projects in advanced planning and construction stages is subject to the express condition that "
no
part of this appropriation shall be used for projects not
48
authorized by law."
There is also a section in the Water
Supply Act that requires Congressional approval for modifica
of a reservoir project which would "seriously affect the
purposes for which the project was authorized, surveyed,
planned, or constructed, or which would involve major
49
structural or operational changes.''
The problem is not
likely to arise, however, because virtually all recent
projects are authorized for all conceivable purposes.
Therefore modification of the use of contracted water from
them would merely be a switch from one authorized purpose tet
another, and would not be sufficient enough to require
Congressional approval. coal conversion will probably fit
into the category of "industrial" use, a purpose for contract
water specifically contemplated by the Water Supply Act.
Apparently, then, all a local interest will have to do to
change the use of its contracted water storage is apply to
the agency involved, which may then revise "the existing
lease or agreement to evidence th~ conversion of its rights
50
This is apparently so for
to the use of the storage."
projects build prior to the passage of the Water Supply Act
as well as for those constructed after 1958.
The only limitations upon any such change expressed
the Act is that "all authorized purposes served by the
project shall share equitably in the benefits of multiple
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construction.

At least two cases have held that

unit of a project cannot serve its principle antipurpose, it can be used to advance any other authorized

52
of the project.
The administrative procedure aside, there are problems
will be encountered in attempting to alter the use of
ter supply storage.

The National Environmental Policy Act

equires that an environmental impact statement be filed for
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
53
Courts have applied
d other major Federal actions."
is requirement broadly, with one court declaring that
triviality of the federal action will not necessarily mean

54
o impact statement is required."

Coal conversion, with

ts tremendous water needs and potential for thermal pollution,
11 assuredly affect the environment enough that a N.E.P.A.
statement will be required before water supply storage
converted to its use.
In addition, the Water Resources
55
anning Act of 1965
authorized the Water Resources
principles, standards and procedures
r planning and evaluating federal water and related land
ource projects.

These standards were published in 1971
56
became effective October, 1973.
The standards state
objectives: enhancement of national economic development,
enhancement of the environment. Thus both an economic

dy and an environmental study are required to change the
57
reservoir.
The N.E.P.A. impact statement can serve
economic study, but the environmental study is not to
a dollars and cents basis, but rather the W.R.C.
give a detailed procedure for determining the
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58
environmental impact.

The guidelines require all alter59
native plans to be considered.
Another problem involves the nature of the rights
vested in the stored water.

The Water Supply Act of 195 8

leaves the acquisition of rights to the water to be stored
to the contracting party, who must follow state procedures
in acquiring them, which is usual

done either through

condemnation proceedings or by negotiated purchase.

The

rights acquired by a local interest may allow the storage
water to be used for coal conversion or may not, depending
on what system of water law the state uses.

Kentucky water

law is a sort of modified riparian rights system wherein
most parties who wish to draw from the state's navigable
waters must apply for and receive a permit before doing so,
but with some users exempted from the permit system and
to use the water on a riparian rights basis.

The Kentucky

permit system is not well drawn and whether a permit holder
will be allowed to switch the use of the water from the use
for which he acquired the permit is anybody's guess, and the
acquired rights .in storage water may vary from project to
project depending on whether the contracting party is a
state interest, a local interest operating under a permit,
or a local interest, with riparian rights.
There is also the possibility of a federal-state
conflict in changing

the use of storage water in that

·~

le

is the individual state that specifies the nature of a
user's rights in the water involved and the means by whicl:l
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to be acquired, but it is the federal agency
involved that must approve the change of the use of that
>water.

For example, Kentucky has a statute that would

'forbid the switch of storage water to coal conversion if
such would interfere with agriculture, but federal law does
not accord such paramount rights to farmers.

There is also

a possible, albeit improbable, federal-state conflict if the
.state should happen to have more stringent environmental
'standards than the national standards.
federal-state conflict is unclear.

The outcome of a

Federally created water

rights would obviously, in light of the Ivanhoe Irrigation
61
60
District v. McCracken
and Nebraska v. Wyoming
decisions,
prevail over state-created water rights, but the federal
>government usually prefers to cooperate with the states in
water matters.
6.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972

In addition to regulating the discharge of pollutants
waters of the United States, Federal water pollution conlegislation also affects water storage.

The 1961 Arnend62
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
reads
survey or planning of any reservoir by the Corps

Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, or other Federal
consideration shall be given to inclusion of
for regulation of streamflow for the purpose of
quality control, except that any such storage and
releases shall not be provided as a substitute
r adequate treatment or other methods of controlling
source."

The 1972 Federal Water Pollution

ntrol Act Arnendments 63 seem to have directly dealt with

.e question of whether water stored for water quality
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purposes can later be converted to some other use: "In the
case of any reservoir project authorized for construction
the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation or other
Federal agency, when the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency determines . . . that any storage in such
project for regulation of streamflow for water quality is
not needed, or is needed in a different amount, such project
may be modified accordingly by the head of the·appropriate
agency, and any storage no longer required for water quali•,;
',
may be utilized for other authorized purposes of the proj
when in the opinion of the head of such agency, such use
64
justified
"
Thus there is authorization for modifying the use of
water quality storage.
tions.

There are, however, several restric·

Water stored for water quality is not going to be

free for coal gasification unless it is not needed for watfr:
quality control; the federal government is going to have

all

interest in seeing that the water is used for the contractei!
purpose, an interest that a long history of cases has show~
will prevail over any conflicting state or local interests.
The resolution of the question as to whether the con·
tracted water is in fact needed for water quality purposes
may ultimately hinge on when the contract was entered into,
There have been several amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act since 1961, the most significant
those of 1972.

The 1972 F.W.P.C.A. amendments made one

significant change in the 1961 act, this being that
under the 1961 act the need for and value of storage for
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·.:'

er quality purposes was determined by the federal agency

iii

!·'

ating the project, since 1972 "the need for, the value

,

and the impact of, storage for water quality control"
65
The 1961
11 be determined by the EPA Administrator.
and the 1972 act taken together have been judicially
to mean that it is up to the Corps to determine

'i

!I

e need for water quality storage for projects that were
the planning or authorization stage as of the passage
the 1972 amendments, but for the EPA Administrator to
termine if the project was not beyond the authorization
66
That the Corps and EPA might have
age as of 1972.
fferent views as to whether storage water is needed for
ter qualtiy purposes hardly needs elaboration.
The 1972 amendment also places some limitations on the
dification of use of water quality storage.

These are

at if water quality was to provide between 15 and 25% of
of a project, water stored for water qualtiy may
another authorized project only with Congressional
roval; if water quality was to provide more than 25% of
e projected benefits of the project, the water earmarked
water quality purposes may not be used for any other
67
under any conditions.
If water quality was to
less than 15% of the benefits of a project, the
water may be converted to some other use upon the
Administrator's determination (or, presumably, the
's determination for projects beyond the authorization
ge as of 1972) that the storage is not needed for water
lity purposes.

i
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In addition, the same problems with regard to acqui .
ring
the necessary water rights and complying with the N.E.P,A,
impact statement and Water Resources Council standards
exist for changing

the use of water supply storage also

pertain for changing

the use of water quality storage.

N.E.P.A. requires notice to the public with regard
environmental impact statements, so challenges from environ,
mental groups concerning conversion from water quality to
coal gasification are inevitable.

The major pollution

problem arising from water being used for gasification
be thermal pollution.

The possible detrimental effect on

water quality include reducing species' diversity or abundru
reducing capacity of water to hold disssolved oxygen, and
indirect effects on aquatic organisms, such as changes in
metabolic rate, respiration, behavior and migration,
rates, growth and reproduction, and increased susceptibility
68
to parasites and diseases.
Thus even if the water is not
needed to reduce the effects of pollution, the fact that ~t
use of it for gasification may add to pollution may prohibit
its being used for that purpose.
C.

Federal Regulatory Powers and Coal Conversion.
Federal water resource policies will undoubtedly have

significant impact on the development of a coal conversioa
industry in Kentucky.

The construction of physical fac

such as levees, dams and reservoirs under various flood
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I·., i

ontrol programs or the Water Supply Act of 1958 will

1

11

1·:

In some cases, part of the

'

conversion purposes.
However, some aspects of federal regulatory policies
place serious constraints on the development of an
independent water allocation program at the state level.
or example, the state could not authorize diversions
der its water permit system that interfered with federal
This may prove trouble-

e in connection with the location of large-scale coal
Ohio River and its tributaries.
reover, thermal discharges by coal conversion facilities
will be subject to existing federal water pollution
. 1 a t.1.on. 69
1 eg1.s

No state water allocations system can ignore the
In

decade or so there has been an increasing tendency
water resources development as a national problem.

70

's does not mean that a state has no voice with respect
'the internal allocation of water resources within its
but it does suggest that the various states and
federal government will have to coordinate their res·
· the water resources area. 71
·tive po 1·1.c1.es
1.n

Common goals

priorities should be agreed upon and pursued in a coative fashion.

I

,I

If the federal government maintains its

,I

I

I

1·i

ater impounded in these facilities could be utilized for

istence of federal powers in the water resources area.

·,,

'

i:I

navigation.

I

I

,

ay substantially increase (or decrease) the availability
f water at a particular site.

\i .:

1 1,·

!
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commitment to a policy of energy independence and contin

'

Ue11

to regard the development of a coal conversion industry as}
a means of achieving this goal, the chances for agreement
on a water allocation program for this purpose seem very
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water Allocation Systems and Coal Conversion
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coal gasification and liquefaction facilities will
large quantities of water both for cooling purposes
for use as a raw material in some of the conversion
Therefore, the feasibility of coal conversion
of meeting the nation's future energy needs
ends, at least in part, on the availability of an adete and dependable water supply in areas where such
ilities will be located.

This involves legal as well

technological considerations.

Not only must the nee-

ary water be physically available, but coal conversion
ilities must be able to obtain a sufficient legal injustify the huge capital outlays that such
enterprise requires.
This study has examined three systems of water allin order to determine which of them is most resto the needs of the coal conversion industry.
first was the traditional riparian doctrine that preUnited State&.

The second was prior

is found in most of the western states.
third approach, state regulation under a permit system,
a hybrid which contained features of both riparianism
appropriation.
Each of these systems of water allocation has its
ntages and disadvantages.

The riparian system, es-

surface water is concerned, is probably

j
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too restrictive for the needs of large-scale industrial
users such as the coal conversion industry.

Moreover ,

water rights under the riparian reasonable use rule are
uncertain and insecure.

On the other hand, water rights

under the prior appropriation system are secure, at least
in the case of senior appropriators, but the system is
inflexible in many respects and may be difficult to establish in a riparian state such as Kentucky.

Therefore ,

the third approach seems to be the most promising one.
Properly conceived, a water allocation framework involving
state regulation under a permit system will combine many
of the best aspects of both riparianism and prior appropriation while avoiding many of the undesirable features
of these systems.
While it is not possible at present to propose
draft legislation, 1 the remainder of this section will
examine some of the features a well-designed water allocation system should have and suggest ways in which
Kentucky's existing water rights legislation might be
improved.

Such a system would advance the interests of

the coal conversion industry by i~proving the efficiency
of the state's entire water allocation system.

The re-

sulting reduction of waste and the stabilization of water
rights would hopefully make more water available for productive uses, thus benefiting both the coal conversion
industry and other private water users.
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A Proposed System of Water Allocation
water Resources Planning
comprehensive planning, which is essential to a
nd water resources policy,

2

requires adequate legis-

ive autho;i:oity, sufficient financial support and an
.il'ctive administrative structure.
Administrative Structure
Ideally, planning responsibility should be concenwithin a single agency.

3

This objective, is

realized in practice, however, because of the large
of federal, state and local governmental agencies
lved in water-related activities.

It may be more

listic, therefore, to avoid unnecessary fragmentation
duplication of planning effort while providing mechJms for coordination in those areas where planning
nsibility is apportioned among several agencies or

In Kentucky, planning authority, as in most states,
dispersed among various instrumentalities of
local government.

At the state level the De-

nt for Natural Resources and Environmen.tal Proplanning responsibilities.

4

r, both the Water Resources Authority 5 and the

r' s ca b'inet 6 also possess planning power in the
resources area.

At the local level numerous public
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organizations have a limited planning function associated
with their respective water resource development activit· ,
ies,_
These include drainage, levee and reclamation districts,7
soil and water conservation districts;
servancy districts,
. t s. 11
. t ric
d is

9

8

'

watershed con-

flood control districts,

10

and water

Furthermore, municipal and county planning

units are authorized under the state zoning enabling act
to

12
.
d o wa t er resources panning.
1

Finally, planning by

federal agencies such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer 8 13
or the Environmental Protection Agency

14

may have a

significant impact on the water resources of this state.
Despite the plethora of institutions with planning
powers in Kentucky, some coherence is nonetheless achieved
in the planning process by both formal and informal provisions for coordination.

Federal agencies, usually work

closely with their counterparts at the state level.
such coordination is required by statute,

15

Often

but even in

the absence of such provisions, cooperation on an informal
basis no doubt occurs.

On the state level, the Department

for Natural Resources supervises many aspects of local
water resource planning.

The Depqrtment, for example,

may study and review all reports concerning or affecting
water related projects within the state which are proposed
for construction for federal, state or local governmental
agencies. 16

In addition, the Department may review pro-

posals for any project which involves the use of state
funds in the construction or maintenance of works f or

nood.

165

or water development purposes.

17

',i

11

Finally,

I

;J;.governmental bodies (and private individuals)

'i

I!

I

I!

;

•

1

;! !

permit from the Department before they

1'!1

I

I·,,

'ill

any dam, embankment, levee, dike, bridge,
other obstruction across or along any stream.

18

it seems that the Department may prevent local
resource development agencies from acting conto its own policies.
e relationship between the Department and the
Resources Authority is not clearly defined in
cky's water resources statute.

The Department's

ing responsibilities are rather explicitly defined
e statute.

19

Its regulatory powers over consump-

'
d ments 20 as we 11 as its
.
water uses an d impoun
superlocal public water development agencies
large staff all suggest that it should
primary water resources planning agency in the
The Secretary of Natural Resources and EnvironProtection is a member of the Water Resources
. ts vice-c
.
h airman.
.
22
an d i

This contact be-

n the two agencies would allow at least some form

The Water Resources Authority, appears to be
tily concerned with the financing, rather than
planning of state and local water resource developprojects.23

Nevertheless, the Water Resources

rity is authorized "to coordinate the programs of

, 'I'
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all state agencies in the conservation, development
and wise use of public water,"

24

and to "promote the

beneficial and proper distribution of water throughout the Commonwealth."

25

Moreover, the Authority has

explicit power to engage in water development planning26
and maintains some supervisory authority over the Department.

27

It appears that most of the actual planning is
carried on by the Department subject to some oversight
by the Water Resources Authority.

This arrangement may

be a satisfactory one, but the relationship between these
agencies with respect to water resources planning should
be defined more specifically in the statute.
2.

The Planning Process
The planning process involves the formulation of

goals and objectives, the establishment of priorities,
the acquisition of data and the development of implementation procedures and strategies.

The planning pro-

cess may also be divided into developmental and allocative
elements.

Developmental planning is concerned with in'

creasing the available water supply in a particular area
by reducing evaporation and run off or by promoting the
transfer of water from another region.

This aspect of

water resources planning usually involves the location
and design of physical structures such as levees, dikes,
dams and reservoirs.

The Kentucky statute authorizes such
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by both the Department for Natural Resources
28 db th
'
vironmental Protect:i.on
an
y
e Water Resources

planning must also deal with prowater allocation.

Just as zoning and other

controls must be made in accordance with a
plan,

30

so also must consumptive use

., tions, such as those suggested below, be based
titutionalized planning.

Regulation should be

, not as an end in itself, but as a means of implanning process.

A system of consumptive

use permits coordinated with a program of compreplanning is the most effective means of implethe state's planning objective and of directing

31
.
a 1 ong p 1 anne d 1 :i.nes.
Ideally, each of the elements of the planning proshould be described in some detail by the legisand further supplemented by administrative regons.32

Furthermore, it may be desirable to re-

a specific document, known as a state water
Florida has adopted this approach, 33 which
the Model Water Code.

34

Consumptive Use Permits
As the discussion in chapter 4 indicated, there
number of weaknesses in Kentucky's existing
permit system.

In fact it is doubtful whether

"''i:iresent regulatory structure could be used effectto implement planning decisions.

Accordingly, a
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number of suggestions have been made below to remedy
this deficiency.
(a)

Exemptions
Arguably Kentucky's present regulatory framework

is not comprehensive enough to permit the allocation of
water resources on a truly rational basis.

The definition

of "public waters," which includes both surface and ground
water,

35

is broad enough, 36 but the regulatory scheme

is undermined by a variety of use exemption categories.
(i)

Existing Uses
The constitutional implications of water resources

regulation by the state have been examined elsewhere
in this study.

Some states have attempted to avoid or

at least minimize the substantive due process issue by
exempting presently-exercised riparian rights from regualtion.

Existing users may be exempted entirely, 37

given a preferential right to a permit,

38

or required

to obtain a permit only when their present use is increased.39

Other states, such as Florida 40 and Iowa,

41

regulate existing water users in the same manner as
new users.

.
.
Kentuc k ya 1 so regu 1 at~s existing
users 42 and

this practice should be maintained.
(ii)

Exempted Use Categories

Kentucky exempts a substantial number of water use
44
categories from regulation, 43 as do many other states.
Generally this is undesirable.

Not only does this prac-

tice undermine the effectiveness of the state's water
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tion policy, but it may lead to conflicts between
water users.

In particular,

the water use permit right may be comexistence of a large number of unreg-

. 45 and other small users 46 may

Domestic

pted for reasons of economy or administrative
but other users should be subject to

Geographical Limitations
"~entucky' s water use regulations are applied on a
basis.

Some states, however, regulate water

in those areas where serious water resource
developed.

47

This approach has merit

it permits the state to act where a response
ded but avoids unnecessary regulation.

This

h seems particularly suited to a state where
water supply problems are likely to be
rather than state-wide in nature.

Another

se is to proceed, as Florida has done, on a regUnder the Florida Water Resources Act of
is divided into f~ve water management
and consumptive use regulations vary from
district in accordance with the supply and
pattern of each area.

One of these forms of

regulation might be desirable in Kencoal conversion facilities are concentrated
few water courses instead of being widely
sed throughout the state,
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(b)

Specificity of Water Right
One advantage of the permit system over common-law

riparianism is that consumptive use rights may be clearly defined in terms of quantity, place of withdrawal,
place of use and so forth.

Kentucky's present water

use regulations conform to this desirable p:rr.active. 4 9
(c)

Beneficial use
The encouragement of productive uses and the pre-

vention of waste are important objectives of any system
of water allocation.

This principle is embodied in the

terms "reasonable use" and "beneficial use."

Neverthe-

less, it appears that something more than economic
efficiency is involved in the distributi?ri of water
rights.

Water rights in the West,

eastern permit systems,
beneficial use.

51

50

and under some

are based on a finding of

Although this term is not always

legislatively defined, it seems that it functions as
a threshold standard.

A proposed use is either beneficial

or wasteful; beneficial uses are permitted while wasteful
or nonbeneficial ones are not.

Rarely does a water reg-

ulatory agency attempt to characterize one use as "more
beneficial" than another for purposes of allocating water
rights even though an economist might be able to measure
the relative efficiency of the respective uses.

In other

words, beneficial use is an absolute rather than a relative
standard and, therefore, provides little help in distinguishing among various alternative water uses.

Consequent-

. tiOll
ly, consumptive use permits, under both prior appropria
·
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non-riparian jurisdictions, are usually awarded
lfirst-come, first served'' basis as long as the pro.
. 152 an d wa t er is
' avai'l a bl e. 53
use is
bene f.icia
tucky, a permit must be granted for a "useful purThe term "beneficial use" is used elsewhere
statute, 55 but is not defined.

Nevertheless, it

that beneficial use is the basis of permit rights
Therefore, it is recommended that the term
ined and explicitly incorporated into the regulatory

of Water Right
of water allocation must strike a balance
and flexibility.

This problem arises in

with fixing the length of time for which a perbe granted.

A system of water rights based on

of perpetual duration, like the prior appropriation
m of the West, may suffer from problems of excessive
ity.

57

If a permit period is too short, however,

istment in long-term facilities may be discouraged.

58

regulatory proposals provide for permits of specific
59
These range from a ten-year maximum in Iowa,
60
fifty-year maximum under the Model Water Use Act.
e present time permits of indefinite duration are
This is undesirable.

A durational

some sort should be placed on the issuance of all
The time period allowed should bear some reasonrelationship to the projected duration of the intended
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enterprise.

In the case of coal conversion, a permit of

fifty year's or more duration may be necessary to insure
that the original investment is full amortized.
(e)

Locational Use Limitations
Locational use limitations are among the most serious

weaknesses of the riparian system.

61

Nevertheless, a sur-

prising number of statutory water allocation systems fail
to treat these matters very explicitly.

62

In Kentucky,

for example, nothing is said about whether a nonriparian
. a consump t'ive use permit.
. 63
can o bt ain

Use beyond the

watershed, is expressly authorized if the permission of
64
the Water Resources Authority is obtained.
In prior appropriation jurisdictions, of course, such
uses are allowed as a matter of right if the proposed use
is otherwise qualified.

This position also prevails in

Florida 65 and would seem to be the better approach.

The

agency should not distinguish between riparian and nonriparian applicants and transportation beyond the watershed should be allowed unless it can be shown that existing
users would be adversely affected.
(f)

Reallocation Mechanisms
Since the beneficial use standard does not distinguish

among water uses on the basis of economic efficiency, the
initial allocation pattern will almost certainly fail to
achieve maximum productive use of the resource.

In other

words, once the available water supply has been allocated
to permittees by the regulatory agency, a net increase in
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occur if water within the system is reless productive uses to more productive
This feature would be important to the coal
industry, as well as other industrial users,
uses will usually be more productive than
ltural uses.

This reallocation may be accomplished

her market or nonmarket mechanisms.
Transfers
other things being equal, the market is probably
resource allocation mechanism than an administrative
67

Resource allocation decisions are seldom made by
means in the United States except where the

cannot allocate efficiently (or no market exists
)

68

or where distributional or other considerations

re important than efficiency goals.

69

Unfortunate-

se conditions often occur where water resources
Because of the nature of water, changes in
or location of use sometimes adversely affect
These conditions may be regarded as negative
If the costs to other users are not
into account by the transacting parties, an inof resources may result (at least
ciety's point of view). 70

In order to prevent this

curring, some restrictions on voluntary transfers
necessary.

At the present time the Kentucky statute

ent on the issue of transferability.

Instead of ig-

the problem, a better approach would be to allow
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such transfers to occur, but also to subject them to
administrative review in order to protect the interest of
other users and the public.
(ii)

71

Involuntary Transfers
Transaction costs or other factors sometimes pre-

vent water users from effecting a more efficient allocation
72
of the resource by means of voluntary transfers.
In
such cases it may be desirable to allow one user to acquire
a water right from another user by condemnation.

Munici-

palities and other public bodies often possess such
The power of eminent domain, including the power to condemn
water rights, has also been given in many states to public
utilities and other private corporations affected with the
. in
. t erest. 74
pu bl ic

Arguably such power could be given to

coal conversion facilities.

In fact, coal conversion dev-

elopment and demonstration projects in Kentucky currently
possess explicit statutory authority to acquire water rights
.
.
d omain.
. 75
t h roug h t h e exercise
o f eminent

If this power

were extended to commercial coal conversion facilities
generally, it would allow them to obtain additional water
supplies as their operations expanded in the future.
Of course it may be unwise to single out one enterprise for preferential treatment since this smacks of
"special interest" legislation.

The use of a preference

system may provide a suitable compromise.

Under this

approach, found in some prior appropriation jurisdictions,
a system of statutory preference categories is created
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water user in a high preference category to conwater right of a water user in a lower preference
If this approach were adopted in Kentucky
rial users, including coal conversion facilities,
1d occupy a high preference category, perhaps below
•:that of municipal water supply and recreational uses.
Renewal Applications
·. Many permit systems in the East contain procedures
the renewal of a permit,

77

although some states, such

ntucky, ignore the matter entirely.

Moreover, even

e renewal is mentioned, no state, with the exception of
ida, 78 deals effectively with the problem of competing
ications where one of the parties is a renewal applicant.
is the stage at which the regulatory system can most
tly promote a particular water use pattern.

As long

e available water supplies are ample it is difficult
ny a permit to any applicant whose proposed use meets
... beneficial use standard.

On the other hand, when there

enough water to go around, some applicants must be
a permit.

In such situations, contests between re-

1 applicants and initial applicants are bound to occur.
enewal applicant would have a strong equitable claim
ain his water right, but the other applicants might
st for more productive uses.

A system that is effi-

-oriented would require that the more productive use
However, since beneficial use is an absolute
than a compariative standard, one use cannot be
beneficial than another..

One approach is to

79
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use preference categories.

For example, the regulatory

scheme may provide that where competing applications are
made before the agency it shall prefer industrial uses
agricultural uses (or vice versa).

A better approach,

however, would be to favor in such circumstances the
applicant whose proposed use best conforms to the state
use plan.

In theory, the renewal applicant, if he is dis-

placed by the new applicant, has not been treated unreason
since his original investment has been fully amortized
over the period of his initial permit.

However, the reg-

ulatory system could properly require the new water user
to pay some compensation to the displaced user such as re.
80
l ocation expenses.

(g)

Temporary Water Shortage
Kentucky, like most states,

81

fails to provide an

adequate mechanism for allocating water during periods of
water shortage.

Kentucky's approach is essentially crisis-

reactive and does little to prevent a crisis condition
from arising in the first place.

82

Advance planning for

periods of water shortage seems more productive.

As part

of this planning process, the regulatory agency should adopt
a system of permit classification according to source of
supply, method of extraction or diversion, use of water,
some combination of these factors.

83

This plan will be

implemented upon declaration of the water shortage and
remain in effect until the agency rescinded its declaration
of water shortage. 84

Since restrictions on water use would
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on a class basis, individual permit users
some advance idea of their relative priority
shortage.
Recommendations
Although this study is primarily concerned with the
ected water needs of coal conversion facilities

(should

al conversion industry develop in this state), it is
icult and probably undesirable to isolate this problem
the broader issue of water rights generally.

A system

rights which couples comprehensive planning with a
and effective regulatory policy will benefit all
including the coal conversion industry.
Therefore, it is suggested that the Legislature consider
rehensive revision of KRS chapter 151 in the near
The existing statute can be improved by (1) clarg the planning functions of the Department for Natural
rces and Environmental Protection and the Water Resources
rity;

(2) expanding the scope of the consumptive use

it system by removing most of the exempted use categories;
adopting beneficial use as the basis upon which consumppermits will be granted; ,(4) imposing a durational
water use permits and delineating renewal procedures;
scheme for both voluntary and involuntary
of water rights; and (6) specifying more explicit
for dealing with temporary water shortages.
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conditions.

183

APPENDIX
State Water Use Plan
Florida Statutes §373.036 (1974)
The department shall proceed as rapidly as
to study existing water resources in the state;
and methods of conserving and augmenting such waters;
ing and contemplated needs and uses of water for proand procreation of fish and wildlife, irrigation,
power development, and domestic, municipal, and
trial uses; and all other related subjects, including
age, reclamation, flood-plain or flood-hazard area
g, and selection of reservoir sites.

The department

cooperate with the division of state planning of the
of administration, or its successor agency, proto formulate, as a functional element of a comstate plan, an integrated, coordinated plan for
and development of the waters of the state, based
above studies.

This plan, with such amendments,

ements and additions as may be necessary from time
shall be known as the state water use plan.
In the formulation of the state water use plan,
,&epartment shall give due consideration to:
The attainment of maximum reasonable-beneficial
for such purposes as those referred to in sub-

The maximum economic development of the water rees consistent with other uses.
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(c)

The control of such waters for such purposes

as environmental protection, drainage, flood control, and
water storage.
(d)

The quantity of water available for application

to a reasonable-beneficial use.
(e)

The prevention of wasteful, uneconomical, im-

practical, or unreasonable uses of water resources.
(f)

Presently exercised domestic use and permit

rights.
(g)

The preservation and enhancement of the water

quality of the state and the provisions of the state
water quality plan.
(h)

The state water resources policy as expressed

by this chapter.
(3)

During the process of formulating or revising

the state water use plan, the department shall consult
with, and carefully evaluate the recommendations of, concerned federal, state, and local agencies, particularly
the governing boards of the water management districts,
and other interested persons.
(4)

Each governing board is directed to cooperate

with the department in conducting surveys and
of water resources, to furnish the department with all available data of a technical nature, and to advise and
assist the department in the formulation and drafting of
those portions of the state plan applicable to the
(5)

The department shall not adopt or modify the

state water use plan or any portion thereof without first·
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a public hearing on the matter.

At least ninety

Ii I

advance of such hearing, the department shall
any affected governing boards, and shall give notice

I

by publication within the affected region
I

provisions of chapter 129, except such
by publication shall be extended at least ninety

in advance of such hearings.
For the purposes of this plan the department
n.consultation with the affected governing board,
each water management district into sections which
conform as nearly as practicable to hydrologically
areas and describe all water resources within

The department shall give careful consideration
e requirements of public recreation and to the pron and procreation of fish and wildlife.

The de-

nt may prohibit or restrict other future uses on
·n designated bodies of water which may be inconsisthese objectives.
The department may designate certain uses in
tion with a particular source of supply which, beof the nature of the activity or the amount of water
would constitute an undesirable use for which the
board may deny a permit.
The department may designate certain uses in
tion with a particular source of supply which, beof the nature of the activity or the amount of water
in an enhancement or improvement of

I
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the water resources of the area.

Such uses shall be Pre-

ferred over other uses in the event of competing applicat
under the permitting systems authorized by this chapter.
(10)

The department, in cooperation with the

division of state planning of the department of administration, or its successor agency, may add to the state
water use plan any other information, directions, or
objectives it deems necessary or desirable for the guidan
of the governing boards or other agencies in the administration and enforcement of this chapter.

